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Abstract
Empirical evidence on distributional preferences shows that people do not judge
inequality as problematic per se but that they take the underlying sources of income
differences into account. In contrast to this evidence, current measures of inequality
do not adequately reflect these normative preferences. In this paper we address this
shortcoming by developing a new measure of unfair inequality that reconciles two
widely-held fairness principles: equality of opportunity and freedom from poverty.
We provide two empirical applications of our measure. First, we analyze the devel-
opment of inequality in the US from 1969 to 2014 from a normative perspective.
Second, we conduct a corresponding international comparison between the US and
31 European countries in 2010. Our results document increasing unfairness in the
US over time. This trend is driven by a strong decrease in social mobility that puts
the “land of opportunity” among the most unfair countries in 2010.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Rising income inequality in many countries around the world has led to intense debates –
both in academia and in the public. Calls for more redistribution are often countered by
pointing out that outcome inequalities are i) necessary to incentivize individuals and ii)
may reflect the just deserts of people in a market economy. However, standard measures of
inequality are inappropriate to inform the fairness debate because they neither correspond
to standard principles of distributive justice nor to the distributional preferences upheld
by the larger public. In this paper, we propose a new measure of (unfair) inequality
that reconciles two widely-held normative principles, namely equality of opportunity and
freedom from poverty, into a joint indicator. Bringing this new measure to the data, we
provide important insights about the fairness of inequality, both over time (in the US)
and across countries (in 2010).
Following the seminal work by Piketty and Saez (2003), the literature has documented
a continued increase of income inequality since the beginning of the 1980s in many Western
societies.1 This evidence has strongly influenced public discourse. For example, the
Occupy Wall Street movement’s slogan – “We are the 99%” – directly follows from research
on the income share of the top 1%. Among other interest groups, this movement has
fiercely advocated for more redistribution. To the contrary, free-market pundits emphasize
that through trickle-down effects everybody benefits from growth among the job creators
at the top. As a consequence, more redistribution would dis-incentivize those individuals
and lead to lower welfare for everybody in the long-run. While the equity-efficiency trade-
off dominates public discourse on inequality, an explicit discussion of what we understand
by an equitable distribution of income is mostly absent. To the contrary, the implicit
assumption in much of public discourse as well as in the recent economics literature seems
to be that less inequality by necessity implies a more equitable distribution. However,
it is highly questionable whether our conception of equity is adequately represented by
1See, among others, Atkinson and Piketty (2007), Leigh (2007), Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2015),
Guvenen and Kaplan (2017), and Piketty et al. (2018).
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an inequality measure that invokes perfect equality as the normative benchmark. For
instance, is it really the case that everybody receiving the same income (i.e. a Gini
coefficient of 0) represents the most equitable distribution when people exert different
levels of effort?
In contrast, most theories of distributive justice argue that we should not be concerned
by outcome inequality per se, but that we should rather focus on the sources and structure
of inequality. To do so, these theories differentiate between fair (justifiable) and unfair
(unjustifiable) sources of inequality. Unfair inequality shall be eliminated completely
while fair inequalities ought to persist.2 For example, according to responsibility-sensitive
egalitarian theories of justice, outcome inequalities are unfair if they are rooted in factors
beyond individual control. These factors could not have been influenced by individual
choice and therefore people should not be held responsible for the (dis-)advantages that
follow from them.3 In line with this reasoning, individuals are more willing to accept
income differences which are due to effort and preferences rather than exogenous circum-
stances (Fong 2001; Cappelen et al. 2007; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina et al. 2018).4
Yet, in spite of its wide acceptance, invoking the notion of individual responsibility alone
is insufficient to define fairness (e.g. Konow 2003; Konow and Schwettmann 2016). For ex-
ample, when an outcome is such that it brings deep deprivation to an individual, questions
of how it came about seem secondary to the moral imperative of addressing the extrem-
ity of the outcome, be it hunger, homelessness, violence or insecurity (Bourguignon et
al. 2006).5 Hence, while outcome differences based on exogenous circumstances imply vi-
2In the social choice literature these two intuitions are formally represented by compensation and
reward principles (Fleurbaey 2008; Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011).
3A non-comprehensive list of works emphasizing this distinction includes Rawls (1971), Sen (1980),
Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1993, 1998), and Lippert-Rasmussen
(2001, 2011).
4Moreover, the literature branches on intergenerational mobility (see, e.g., Solon 1992; Bjo¨rklund and
Ja¨ntti 1997; Black and Devereux 2011; Corak 2013; Chetty et al. 2014a; Chetty et al. 2014b), the gender
pay gap (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn 2017; Kleven et al. 2018) and also on racial disparities (see, e.g., Lang
and Lehmann 2012; Kreisman and Rangel 2015) are concerned with inequalities that are in each case
rooted in one specific factor beyond individual control. The volume of academic research on these topics
is a further indication that circumstance-based inequalities are of foremost public interest.
5To illustrate this point, Kanbur and Wagstaff (2016) suggest the following thought experiment:
Imagine yourself serving on a soup line. The indigents move forwards and you hand out hot soup. But
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olations of fairness, the reverse statement does not hold true. To the contrary, in addition
to the responsibility criterion there are many reasons why a given outcome distribution
could be considered unfair – one of them being that not everybody has enough to make
ends meet.
In this paper, we propose the first family of measures for unfair inequality that incor-
porate the principles of equality of opportunity (EOp) and freedom from poverty (FfP)
in a co-equal fashion. In line with the previous discussion, we therefore take seriously
the idea that equity is not represented by the absence of any inequality in outcomes, but
that it requires life success to be orthogonal to exogenous circumstances (EOp) and that
everybody should have enough to make ends meet (FfP).
To do so, we build on the norm-based approach towards inequality measurement (Cow-
ell 1985; Magdalou and Nock 2011). In a first step, we construct a fair income distribution
that complies with both the principles of EOp and FfP as the benchmark.6 In a second
step, we measure unfair inequality as the divergence between this norm distribution and
the observed income distribution. We show that our proposed measure is easily inter-
pretable and exhibits desirable properties identified in the measurement literature. It
furthermore nests standard measures of both equality of opportunity and poverty.
Our paper makes two main contributions. First, we develop the first measure of
unfair inequality that reconciles EOp and FfP in a co-equal fashion. Both EOp and FfP
have a vast theoretical and empirical literature. Yet, characterizations of unfairness that
have relied on separate application of either principle have been criticized concerning
their theoretical scope as well as their policy implications (Kanbur and Wagstaff 2016).
Moreover, previous attempts to reconcile the two principles are scant and subject to
important drawbacks. For example, existing works give priority to either EOp or FfP,
in one case a new piece of information is given to you. You are told that the outcome of the person in
front of you was not due to circumstances but a lack of effort. Would you withdraw your soup holding
hand because her outcome is morally justifiable according to the responsibility criterion? If not, clearly
some other principle is cutting across the power of the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian argument.
6Note that standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini index, can also be understood as norm-
based measures, in which the norm vector requires perfect equality. The explicit construction of a norm
distribution lays bare the normative assumptions that underpin the respective inequality measure.
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while treating the second principle as a mere weighting factor (Brunori et al. 2013). We
address these shortcomings by treating EOp and FfP as co-equal principles conveying
different grounds for compensation. That is, we develop an inequality measure that
detects unfairness emanating from unequal opportunities or poverty even if one of the
two guiding principles is satisfied.
Second, our measure yields important insights for the inequality debate and the design
of appropriate policy responses. We provide two empirical applications of our measure.
First, we analyze the development of inequality in the US over the time period 1969-2014
from a normative perspective. Our results show that the US trend in unfair inequality
has mirrored the marked increase of total inequality since the beginning of the 1980s.
However, beginning with the 1990s unfair inequality follows a steeper growth curve than
total inequality. We illustrate that this trend is mainly driven by a less equal distribution
of opportunities across people that face different circumstances beyond their individual
control. Second, we provide a corresponding international comparison between the US
and 31 European countries in 2010. We find that unfairness in the US shows a remarkably
different structure than in societies with comparable levels of unfairness in Europe. Our
evidence suggests that inequality in the most unfair European societies is largely driven
by poverty increases that followed the financial crisis of 2008. To the contrary, unfairness
in the US is driven by marked decreases in social mobility. Finally, we acknowledge that
the exact definition of the categories “fair” and “unfair” is a normative choice and hence
open to debate. We therefore provide extensive sensitivity analyses in which we probe
our baseline results against alternative normative assumptions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we clarify the under-
lying normative principles of EOp and FfP. In section 3 we develop our measure of unfair
inequality. Section 4 provides the two empirical applications describing unfair inequality
in the US over time and in an international comparison. Sensitivity analyses with re-
spect to alternative normative assumptions are provided in section 5. Lastly, section 6
concludes.
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2 NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES
Equality of Opportunity. Equality of opportunity (EOp) is a popular concept of
fairness that is used to evaluate distributions of various outcomes, including health, edu-
cation or income. Following the seminal contributions by Van de gaer (1993), Fleurbaey
(1995), and Roemer (1993, 1998), a vivid theoretical and empirical literature evolved that
weaves the idea of personal responsibility into inequality research.7 Opportunity egalitar-
ians deem inequalities ethically acceptable to the extent that they are rooted in factors
of individual responsibility. To the contrary, they condemn inequalities that follow from
factors beyond individual control. Prominent examples of the latter are, for example, the
biological sex, race, or the socioeconomic status of parents. If individual responsibility
factors were the sole determinants of the observed outcome distribution, the EOp ideal
would be realized to its full extent.
To operationalize the opportunity-egalitarian idea, the literature draws on the con-
cepts of circumstances and efforts, where circumstances are those outcome determinants
for which individuals shall not be held responsible. On the contrary, efforts belong to
the realm of personal responsibility. To the extent that the former rather than the lat-
ter are stronger (weaker) determinants of the empirical outcome distribution, a society
is considered less (more) fair than otherwise. Measures of EOp are underpinned by two
fundamental ideas. First, people should be compensated for unequal circumstances. A
prominent formulation of this idea is the principle of ex-ante compensation which postu-
lates that opportunity sets ought to be equalized across people with differential circum-
stances. The principle is ex-ante because opportunity sets are evaluated prospectively
without regard to the individual level of effort exertion. Second, people should be appro-
priately rewarded for their efforts. While there are again different formulations of this
idea, one prominent version is the principle of utilitarian reward. Utilitarian reward states
that effort should be rewarded in a way that maximizes the aggregate outcome of people
7See Roemer and Trannoy (2016), Ferreira and Peragine (2016), and Ramos and Van de gaer (2016)
for recent overviews.
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with the same circumstances. It entails that outcome differences between individuals with
the same circumstances are a matter of indifference. Ex-ante utilitarian measures of EOp
therefore boil down to measures of between-group inequality where groups are defined
by their respective circumstance characteristics.8 The precise cut between circumstances
and efforts is normatively contentious. For example, some argue in favor of including
genetic endowments into the set of circumstances (Lefranc et al. 2009) while others deny
that outcomes flowing from advantageous natural endowments are less praiseworthy than
outcomes flowing from effort (Miller 1996). Similarly, it is widely debated whether the
correlation between effort levels and circumstances constitutes a ground for compensa-
tion or not. While some argue in favor of holding people responsible for their preferences
regardless of how they are formed (Barry 2005), others allocate such correlation to the
circumstances that demand compensation (Roemer 1998). In our baseline empirical ap-
plication in section 4, we draw on commonly accepted circumstance characteristics and
allocate the correlation between circumstances and efforts to the unfair determinants of
inequality. However, we provide sensitivity analyses for different responsibility cuts in
section 5.
Beyond theoretical reasoning, there is compelling empirical evidence that people in-
deed disapprove of inequalities that are rooted in factors beyond individual control.
Alesina et al. (2018) use information treatments to show that policy preferences with
respect to taxation and spending on opportunity-equalizing policies are robustly corre-
lated with perceptions of social mobility. The lower social mobility within a society,
the more people are willing to remedy existing inequalities by appropriate policy inter-
ventions. Faravelli (2007) demonstrates that perceptions of justice tend to more equal
distributions when income differences originate from contextual factors that could not
have been influenced by individuals. The works of Cappelen et al. (2007) and Krawczyk
(2010) confirm that people uphold the equal-opportunity ideal even if it adversely affects
their own material interests.
8For a comprehensive discussion of different compensation and reward principles see the works of
Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) and Ramos and Van de gaer (2016).
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Freedom from Poverty. Poverty is an important focal point in public debates about
the appropriate distribution of material resources. In the philosophical literature the focus
on the least advantaged has been defended by reference to sufficientarian conceptions of
justice (Frankfurt 1987) and arguments that consider material deprivation as a violation
of the undeniable rights we have in virtue of being humans (Fleurbaey 2007).9 Akin
to the literature on EOp, the normative concern for deprivation operates on a principle
of compensation: Deprived people are entitled to be compensated so as to attain the
material conditions to live a life of reasonable comfort.
While there is wide-spread appreciation for the multidimensionality of poverty (Aaberge
and Brandolini 2015), much of the empirical poverty literature focuses on the income di-
mension only. In general, poverty measurement follows a two-step process. First, set
a threshold that partitions the population into its deprived and non-deprived fractions.
All else equal, the more lenient the definition of the deprivation threshold, the larger
the group to which compensation is owed. Second, choose a function to aggregate the
gaps between observed incomes and the deprivation threshold for those whose income
falls below the threshold. In analogy to the cut between circumstances and effort, the
appropriate setting of the poverty line is a widely debated issue in the literature (among
others Foster 1998; Decerf 2017). In our baseline empirical application in section 4, we
draw on an internationally comparable absolute poverty threshold but provide sensitivity
analyses for this choice in section 5.
The concern for poverty alleviation is strongly reflected in the distributional pref-
erences of the general public. The evidence summarized in Konow (2003) and Konow
and Schwettmann (2016) indicates that fairness preferences are sensitive to individual
needs and reflect a concern for everybody having enough to make ends meet. Cappelen
et al. (2013b) use an international dictator game to show that transfers increase if the
recipient comes from a poorer country, while Fisman et al. (2018) show that inequality
9Some object that freedom from poverty does not belong to the theoretical realm of fairness or even
justice although it is morally objectionable. Such moral objections could be raised from a humanitarian
or human rights perspective. In this paper we use the term “unfair” in a colloquial sense to indicate that
a distribution of some good is unfair if it raises moral objection.
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aversion goes hand in hand with a preference for increasing the incomes of the worst-off
in society.
Reconciling EOp and FfP. In this work we treat EOp and FfP as co-equal principles
conveying different grounds for compensation. Our approach is philosophically inspired by
the recognition that both EOp and FfP are individually insufficient to characterize what
a fair distribution of resources requires (Anderson 1999; Vita 2007). These theoretical
insights are bolstered by empirical evidence that distributional preferences are sensitive
to i) ex-ante inequalities that are determined by exogenous circumstances and ii) ex-
post inequalities that are insensitive to responsibility considerations. For example, the
experiments of Cappelen et al. (2013a) show that people largely endorse an ex-ante equal-
opportunity ethic, however, they also correct for ex-post inequalities that are the result
of luck. Andreoni et al. (2019) suggest that social preferences are a mix of ex-ante and
ex-post considerations where the latter gain in importance once the outcome is observed.
Consistent with these findings Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007) show that people tend
to compensate extreme outcomes irrespective of whether they are the result of individual
responsibility factors or not. In Figure S.5 we furthermore show survey evidence on public
support for four principles of justice in 18 European countries that are part of our empirical
application. A consistent pattern emerges: People are not perfect outcome egalitarians.
Instead, they most strongly endorse a distribution of income that is sensitive to individual
need (FfP) and rewards individual effort but not family background characteristics (EOp).
In spite of this evidence, previous attempts to reconcile the (ex-ante) EOp princi-
ple with the (ex-post) FfP principle are scant. First, Brunori et al. (2013) propose an
“opportunity-sensitive poverty measure” according to which identical incomes below the
poverty line receive less weight the more advantageous the circumstances of the poor in-
dividuals that are compared. However, since EOp serves as a mere weighting factor in
the evaluation of incomes below the deprivation threshold, their measure does not detect
any unfairness in societies that are free from poverty but that are characterized by severe
violations of EOp. The measure is therefore informative if one aims to prioritize poor in-
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dividuals based on the responsibility criterion. However, it does not allow to quantify the
overall level of fairness in an observed income distribution. Second, Ferreira and Peragine
(2016) suggest the construction of “opportunity-deprivation profiles” where members of
circumstance types are considered opportunity-deprived if their average outcome falls be-
low a pre-specified deprivation threshold. Effectively, this amounts to applying standard
poverty measures to circumstance types instead of individuals. As a consequence the
measure is informative for the identification of particularly opportunity deprived types.
However, just as the “opportunity-sensitive poverty measure” it does not allow to quantify
the overall level of fairness in an observed income distribution.
3 MEASURING UNFAIR INEQUALITY
In this section we describe how we construct measures of unfair inequality that – in
contrast to previous work – treat EOp and FfP as co-equal principles conveying different
grounds for compensation.
3.1 Notation
Consider the society N = {1, 2, .., N} and an associated vector of non-negative incomes
Y e = (ye1, ye2, ..., yeN). Y e corresponds to the empirical income distribution. Let us further-
more define a minimum income threshold ymin that is required to make ends meet. Based
on Y e and ymin we can partition the population into a poor and a non-poor fraction:
P = {i ∈ N | yei ≤ ymin} , (1)
R = {i ∈ N | yei > ymin} . (2)
Individual incomes at all levels are the result of two sets of factors: First, a set of
circumstances beyond individual control Ω ⊆ RC . Second, a set of individual efforts
Θ ⊆ RE. We define the vector ωi ∈ Ω as a comprehensive description of the circum-
stances with which i ∈ N is endowed. Analogously we define the vector θi ∈ Θ as a
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comprehensive description of the efforts that are exerted by i ∈ N . Based on the real-
izations of circumstances we can partition the population into T circumstance types that
are defined as follows:
T (ω) = {i ∈ N : ωi = ω}. (3)
Similarly, we can partition the population into S effort tranches that are defined as follows:
S(θ) = {i ∈ N : θi = θ}. (4)
For any subgroup X ⊆ N of individuals, we denote by NX = card(X ) the number of
individuals in this subgroup and by µeX = 1NX
∑
i∈X yei their average income. For ease of
notation, we let hereafter N = NN and µe = µeN .
Next to the empirical income distribution Y e, consider a norm (or reference) income
distribution Y r = (yr1, yr2, ..., yrN) that describes the fair distribution of incomes. It is the
normatively desirable income distribution for which the society should strive in absence of
incentive constraints and behavioral responses to redistribution. While Y e is given in the
data, Y r must be constructed based on explicit normative principles.10 Before outlining
the construction of a Y r that is consistent with the normative intuitions of EOp and FfP
in section 3.3, we will now describe how to aggregate the differences between Y e and Y r
into a scalar measure of inequality.
3.2 Measuring Divergence
Endowed with both Y e and Y r one must decide how to aggregate the discrepancies be-
tween both vectors into a scalar measure of unfair inequality. Prominent divergence
measures include the works by Cowell (1985), Magdalou and Nock (2011), and Alm˚as
et al. (2011), each of which generalizes standard measures of inequality. While Cowell
10Note that standard measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient adhere to the norm of outcome
egalitarianism, i.e. this norm distribution is the perfect equality distribution where yri = µe, ∀ i ∈ N .
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(1985) and Magdalou and Nock (2011) provide generalizations of the entropy class of
inequality measures, Alma˚s et al. (2011) generalize the Gini index. The key difference to
standard measures of inequality is that these generalized measures do not decrease (in-
crease) with progressive (regressive) transfers from rich (poor) to poor (rich) but rather
with transfers that reduce (increase) the distance between the empirical and the refer-
ence distribution. Note that this requirement is equivalent to the standard Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfers if and only if the reference distribution is equivalent to the sample
mean µe. Otherwise, transfers from poor to rich can be desirable if the income of the
poor exceeds its reference value, while the income of the rich falls short of it.
In our baseline, we use the measures proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) yielding
the following aggregator for the divergence between Y e and Y r:11
D(Y e||Y r) = ∑
i∈N
[φ(yei )− φ(yri )− (yei − yri )φ′(yri )] , (5)
where
φ(z) =

− ln z, if α = 0,
z ln z, if α = 1,
1
α(α−1)z
α, otherwise.
(6)
As in the family of generalized entropy measures, α is indicative of different value judg-
ments: The higher α, the more weight is attached to positive divergences of empirical
income yei from its respective norm income yri . The lower α, the more weight is attached
to shortfalls from yri . In the baseline we choose α = 0. This choice is guided by the
fact that the MN-measure with α = 0 nests the mean log deviation (MLD) if we set
yri = µe, ∀ i ∈ N . As such we ensure close proximity to the empirical literature on EOp,
in which the use of the MLD is prevalent (among others Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Hufe
et al. 2017). Furthermore, attaching a higher weight to shortfalls from yri is consistent
11We abbreviate this class with MN in the following. The MN-family of divergence measures is char-
acterized by the properties of scale invariance, the principle of population, and subgroup decomposability.
These properties carry directly over to our measures of unfair inequality. Robustness checks using the
measures of Cowell (1985) and Alm˚as et al. (2011) are provided in section 5.4.
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with recent experimental evidence showing a preference for overcompensating the unde-
serving instead of failing to compensate the deserving (Cappelen et al. 2018).12 Thus,
our baseline measure of unfair inequality aggregates divergences between Y e and Y r as
follows:
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈N
[
ln y
r
i
yei
− yri−yei
yri
]
.13 (7)
We will now turn to the construction of a norm vector Y r that accords with the principles
of EOp and FfP.
3.3 Baseline Measure
Norm Vector. Let D ⊆ RN+ be the set containing all possible income distributions d.
In the following we will define subsets of eligible distributions Dh ∈ D that are consistent
with the normative intuitions embodied in the principles of EOp and FfP.
First, since we are concerned with the fair distribution of available resources in a given
society, we follow the inequality measurement literature and rule out creatio ex nihilo:
D1 =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
yri =
∑
i∈N
yei
}
. (8)
Thus, D1 is the subset of distributions in which the total amount of available resources
match their empirical counterpart. By fixing the total amount of resources we let the
distribution of these resources be the only margin of difference between the observed and
the benchmark situation.14 This assumption is standard in the literature on inequality
measurement but highlights an important difference to the quest for optimal tax design.
The latter is concerned with trading off equity and efficiency concerns. In such a frame-
work, restriction (8) would rule out behavioral responses to taxation and only makes sense
12Robustness checks using alternative specifications of α are provided in section 5.4.
13Note that we can scale the measure by 1/N to satisfy the principle of population without further
adjustment since we will constrain the mean of Y r to match the mean of Y e (Magdalou and Nock 2011).
14Cappelen and Tungodden (2017) call restriction D1 the “no-waste-condition”.
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in a first-best setting.15
Second, we characterize the EOp principle by reference to the principle of ex-ante com-
pensation (Fleurbaey and Peragine 2013; Ramos and Van de gaer 2016) which states that
the expected income of an individual should not be correlated to her circumstance type.
Hence, we are infinitely inequality averse with respect to inequalities between circumstance
types and the ideal of an equal-opportunity society is realized if there is equality across
average type incomes µeT (ω). D2 is the subset of distributions for which this criterion is
satisfied:
D2 =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ µrT (ω) = 1NT (ω)
∑
i∈T (ω)
yri =
1
N
∑
j∈N
yej = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω
 . (9)
Note that in this specification we implicitly treat the correlation between Ω and Θ as
morally objectionable. This assumption is in line with the normative account of Roemer
(1998). However, we provide sensitivity checks to this assumption in section 5.
Third, we maintain that people have a claim for a minimum level of resources ymin even
if their outcomes can be ascribed to factors within their realm of control. Opportunity
equalization alone does not achieve this objective. Next to compensating circumstances
Ω, opportunity-egalitarians want to preserve income differences due to effort exertion.
Consistent with this idea, we impose that within types T (ω) efforts should be respected
by distributing incomes proportionally to empirical incomes yei :
yri
yrj
= y
e
i
yej
, ∀ i, j ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.16 (10)
However, while such ex-post proportionality within T (ω) maintains relative differences
15The efficiency costs of reaching the norm distribution are never part of inequality measurement. Ac-
counting for efficiency costs, however, could be part of further analysis. Assuming the joint minimization
of EOp and FfP to be a goal of public policy, our framework could be integrated into models of fair
taxation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2006; Weinzierl 2014; Ooghe and Peichl 2015; Saez and Stantcheva
2016) in which the planner seeks to realize a specific notion of fairness while taking behavioral responses
to taxation into account. See also Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018) for a recent overview on the integration
of fairness principles into the standard Mirrleesian optimal tax framework.
16This condition is a relative version of the “equal-transfer-for-equal-[circumstance]” condition laid out
in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1995).
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in effort exertion, it may keep (push) some i ∈ P (i ∈ R) below ymin. To realize FfP we
therefore want to identify those who are poor due to a lack of effort exertion instead of
exogenous circumstances and compensate them so that they are able to make ends meet.
In line with this insight we define a partition according to which people are labeled (non-
)poor after considering their counterfactual gains from opportunity equalization while
holding them responsible for their individual efforts θi:
P(ω) =
{
i ∈ T (ω)
∣∣∣∣ yei µeµeT (ω) ≤ ymin
}
, ∀ ω ∈ Ω, (11)
R(ω) =
{
i ∈ T (ω)
∣∣∣∣ yei µeµeT (ω) > ymin
}
, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. (12)
Based on the definition of P(ω) and R(ω), we formulate the FfP requirement:
D3 =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω} . (13)
The FfP requirement can be broken down into two parts: yri = 1NP(ω)
∑
j∈P(ω) yrj = µrP(ω)
and µrP(ω) = ymin. The first component states infinite inequality aversion with respect
to income differences among the poor – they all have an equal claim to a certain level
of resources. The second component states infinite inequality aversion with respect to
the average shortfall of the poor population from the poverty line. Within an equal-
opportunity society, they all have an equal claim to nothing less (but also nothing more)
than exactly the minimum subsistence level ymin.
Fourth, combining the proportionality requirement (10) with the FfP condition (13),
there is zero inequality aversion with respect to the share of income that exceeds the
poverty line. Hence, D4 denotes the subset of distributions in which within-type in-
equality of excess income above the poverty line remains unaltered in comparison to the
counterfactual equal-opportunity income distribution:
D4 =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yminyrj−ymin =
yei
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin
, ∀ i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
 . (14)
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The intersection ∩4h=1Dh characterizes our baseline norm distribution which is sum-
marized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Suppose µe > ymin. Then, the intersection ∩4h=1Dh yields a singleton
which defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (yei
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=y˜i
(µe − ymin)
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. (15)
Conversely, if µ ≤ ymin, then ∩4h=1Dh = ∅. The proof for this proposition is given in
Appendix A.
Individuals in P(ω) receive a norm income of ymin. This prescription directly follows
from the FfP requirement specified in (13): Those who are poor due to factors other than
exogenous circumstances are owed compensation to make ends meet but nothing more.
Norm incomes for individuals inR(ω) are determined by the individual share of (coun-
terfactual) income above the poverty threshold, y˜i ∈ (0,∞), and a type-specific scaling
factor, δT (ω) ∈ (0,∞). First, conditional on the individual circumstance type, yri increases
with y˜i. This relation follows from the proportionality condition in (14): In absence of
additional normative grounds for income inequality aversion, relative income differences
among people with similar circumstance characteristics that are able to make ends meet
need to be preserved. Second, the type-specific scaling factor δT (ω) increases with the total
amount of resources that are available relative to the poverty line (µe−ymin). This relation
follows from the constant resource requirement specified in (8) and from fixing incomes
of the poor population P(ω) at the minimum threshold ymin (13): The higher the total
amount of available resources, the smaller the share of resources that needs to be given
up by the members of R(ω) in order to realize FfP. Lastly, the type-specific scaling factor
δT (ω) decreases with the share of non-poor individuals in a type (NR(ω)/NT (ω)) and their
average (counterfactual) income in excess of the minimum threshold (µeR(ω) µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin).
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This relation follows from combining the EOp requirement given in (9) with the FfP re-
quirement given in (13) while observing the proportionality requirement given in (14):
EOp requires equal average outcomes across types. The higher the total volume of trans-
fers to the poor members of a type, the higher the proportional charge levied on the
non-poor members of the same type in order to maintain the EOp requirement.
Equation (15) shows that the fair distribution of incomes Y r is a function of simple
summary statistics of the empirical income distribution Y e. Some may argue that the
normatively desirable distribution of incomes should be independent of the actual dis-
tribution of incomes. However, we note that such a dependence is not particular to our
measurement approach but characterizes many standard measures of inequality, poverty
and inequality of opportunity.17
Furthermore, we note that the extent of such dependence can be strengthened or
loosened in several ways. In fact, whether and to what extent an insulation of Y r from Y e
is desirable, depends on the normative intuitions one strives to capture. For illustrative
purposes we will give two examples in the following. First, ymin can be set i) in absolute
terms or ii) in relative terms as some functional of Y r. Option i) is preferable if one thinks
that the poverty concept applies to basic human needs, while option ii) is preferable if
one aims to capture aspects of social deprivation as well (Foster 1998). In our baseline,
we choose an absolute poverty threshold and therefore insulate ymin from changes in Y e
but provide sensitivity checks to this choice in section 5.3. Second, D4 proposes to honor
within-type income differences since we interpret them as indicators of differential effort
exertion. In line with this normative interpretation, our baseline Y r is dependent on
changes in the intra-type variance of incomes and therefore Y e. However, in section 3.4
we show how the dependence between Y r and Y e can be loosened by harmonizing intra-
type variances in Y r across circumstance types. More generally: While the construction
17For example, the standard approach to inequality measurement can be characterized as finding a
suitable distance measure between the actual distribution and the norm distribution where every indi-
vidual has the mean of the distribution. The properties of the distance measure can be further specified
(for example, the Pigou-Dalton property, the scale independence property, decomposability, etc.). But
as the empirical vector changes, the norm vector also changes. For instance, for the conventional Gini
coefficient it holds that yri = µe, ∀ i ∈ N , implying that Y r changes with µe.
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of Y r may depend on Y e to varying degrees, the underlying principles that inform the
construction of Y r are always independent of the observed distribution of incomes.
Measure and Comparative Statics. Substituting the norm distribution given in
(15) into the divergence measure given in (7), we obtain our baseline measure of unfair
inequality:
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈P(ω)
{
ln ymin
yei
−
(
ymin−yei
ymin
)}
+ 1
N
∑
i∈R(ω)
{
ln
(
ymin+y˜iδT (ω)
yei
)
−
(
(ymin+y˜iδT (ω))−yei
ymin+y˜iδT (ω)
)}
,
(16)
where δT (ω) represents the type-specific scaling factor that is applied to y˜i – the share of
counterfactual income above ymin. To further illustrate the properties of this measure, we
provide some comparative statics in the following.
(1) Assume ymin → 0. The limiting case of ymin = 0 is equivalent to abstracting from
the concern for FfP altogether, whereas EOp remains the only normative foundation for
inequality aversion. In the limit, this leads to P(ω) = ∅, µeR(ω) = µeT (ω), and NR(ω) =
NT (ω). As a consequence, δT (ω) = 1, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. The resulting norm vector as well as the
ensuing measure of unfair inequality read as follows:
yri = yei
µe
µeT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω, (17)
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈N
ln µ
e
µeT (ω)
. (18)
With ymin = 0, unfair inequality collapses to inequality in the distribution of average out-
comes of circumstance types. Hence, as ymin → 0, the measure converges to the standard
ex-ante utilitarian measure of inequality of opportunity in which the MLD is applied to
a smoothed distribution of type-specific mean incomes.
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(2) Assume NP(ω) → 0, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Note the difference to our previous thought experi-
ment in which we abstracted from the concern for FfP altogether. The limiting case of
NP(ω) = 0 corresponds to a society that values FfP below the threshold of ymin but happens
to be in the fortunate position of having zero poverty incidence once incomes are corrected
for the unequal opportunities faced by people with different circumstances. At the limit,
P(ω) = ∅, µeR(ω) = µeT (ω) and NR(ω) = NT (ω). As a consequence, δT (ω) = 1, ∀ ω ∈ Ω
and the resulting norm vector as well as the ensuing measure of unfair inequality read as
follows:
yri = yei
µe
µeT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω, (19)
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈N
ln µ
e
µeT (ω)
. (20)
In spite of the fact that the concern for FfP remains intact, opportunity equalization is
sufficient to satisfy the criteria of both EOp and FfP if NP(ω) = 0, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Hence, the
measure of unfair inequality again converges to the standard ex-ante utilitarian measure
of inequality of opportunity. The limiting case of NP(ω) = 0, ∀ ω ∈ Ω thus illustrates
that the measure continues to detect unfairness through violations of EOp even if FfP is
perfectly satisfied.
(3) Assume we reduce the number of criteria that constitute unfair outcome determi-
nants from an opportunity-egalitarian perspective. This can be represented by letting the
number of circumstance types go to one, i.e. T → 1. At the limit, the entire population
would be considered as a single circumstance type and FfP remains the only normative
foundation for inequality aversion. T = 1 leads to T (ω) = N , P(ω) = P , and R(ω) = R.
Furthermore, NP(ω) = NP , µeT (ω) = µe, and µeP(ω) = µeP . As a consequence, y˜i = yei − ymin
and δT (ω) = (µ
e−ymin)
NR/N(µeR−ymin)
=
(
1− NP/N(ymin−µeP )
NR/N(µeR−ymin)
)
= δ. Thus, the corresponding norm
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vector as well as the resulting measure of unfair inequality read as follows:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P ,
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin − µeP)
NR
N
(µeR − ymin)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ
, ∀ i ∈ R, (21)
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈P
ln
(
ymin
yei
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Watts Index
− 1
N
∑
i∈P
(
ymin−yei
ymin
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poverty Gap
+ 1
N
∑
i∈R
{
ln
(
ymin+(yei−ymin)δ
yei
)
−
( (yei−ymin)(δ−1)
ymin+(yei−ymin)δ
)}
.
(22)
Abstracting from the concern for EOp, leads to a scaling factor δ that is uniform across
all i ∈ R. δ is determined by the ratio of the poverty gap to the amount of excess income
above the poverty line. This contrasts with the baseline case in which the transfer rate
δT (ω) is decreasing with the type-specific share of non-poor individuals and their average
excess income above the poverty threshold.
The decomposability property of the MN-measures allows us evaluate unfairness in
the truncated distribution Y eP = [ye1, ye2, ..., ymin]. Up to ymin, unfair inequality is character-
ized by the difference between the Watts index (Zheng 1993) and the poverty gap ratio.
Individually, these are well-known measures of poverty. However, also their combina-
tion bears a number of desirable properties that have been identified in the literature on
poverty measurement (e.g. Ravallion and Chen 2003). These include monotonicity (as
opposed for example to the headcount ratio), the principle of transfers (as opposed for
example to the poverty gap taken as a stand-alone measure) and additive decomposability.
Note that we do not obtain a measure of poverty that satisfies the focus axiom. Our ap-
proach frames poverty as an aspect of inequality and thus imposes requirements on how
the funds to eradicate poverty should be raised – see condition (14). Therefore, it is not
indifferent to transfers between individuals with incomes above the poverty line ymin (the
third term in equation (22)) and thus violates the focus axiom.
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(4) Let µeT (ω) → µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Note the difference to our previous thought experiment, in
which we let T → 1 and abstracted from the concern for EOp altogether. In contrast to the
previous case, the normative concern for EOp remains intact, however, the EOp principle
is increasingly satisfied as µeT (ω) → µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. The limiting case corresponds to an equal-
opportunity society without disparities in average outcomes across circumstance types.
At the limit, y˜i = yei − ymin, δT (ω) = (µ
e−ymin)
NR(ω)/NT (ω)(µeR(ω)−ymin)
=
(
1− NP(ω)/NT (ω)(ymin−µ
e
P(ω))
NR(ω)/NT (ω)(µeR(ω)−ymin)
)
.
The resulting norm vector and the corresponding measure of unfair inequality read as
follows:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P , ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (yei − ymin)
1−
NP(ω)
NT (ω)
(ymin − µeP(ω))
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω) − ymin)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. (23)
D(Y e||Y r) = 1
N
∑
i∈P
ln
(
ymin
yei
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Watts Index
− 1
N
∑
i∈P
(
ymin−yei
ymin
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poverty Gap
+ 1
N
∑
i∈R
{
ln
(
ymin+(yei−ymin)δT (ω)
yei
)
−
(
(yei−ymin)(δT (ω)−1)
ymin+(yei−ymin)δT (ω)
)}
.
(24)
Since our concern for EOp remains intact we calculate poverty-eradicating transfers across
types by reference to the type-specific poverty gap and the type-specific income share that
exceeds ymin. The limiting case of µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω shows that our measure continues
to detect unfairness through violations of FfP even if EOp is perfectly satisfied.
The previous comparative statics illustrate some particular advantages of our measure
of unfair inequality. First, it is easily interpretable since it nests well-known measures
of both EOp and FfP. If we abstract from the concern for FfP (ymin = 0), we obtain a
standard measure for inequality of opportunity. If we abstract from the concern for EOp
(T = 1), we obtain a combination of the Watts index and the poverty gap ratio, both of
which are well-established measures of poverty.
Second, the proposed measure treats EOp and FfP as co-equal principles and therefore
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detects unfair inequality even if either of the two principles is perfectly satisfied.18 If there
is zero poverty incidence (NP(ω) = 0, ∀ ω ∈ Ω), it still detects unfair inequality based
on average outcome differences across circumstance types. If the income distribution is
perfectly opportunity-egalitarian (µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω), it still requires type-specific
transfers from rich to poor in order to assure the satisfaction of both FfP and EOp.
3.4 Alternative Conceptualizations
Our baseline measure provides one way of reconciling the principles of EOp and FfP. How-
ever, the extensive literature on the measurement of EOp shows that there are different
ways of conceptualizing its underlying normative ideas (Roemer and Trannoy 2016). In
this section we discuss two alternations to the EOp concept and show how these impact
the reconciliation of EOp with FfP.19
First, the baseline norm demands the equalization of average incomes across circum-
stance types. This is a weak criterion of equality of opportunity since it only requires the
expectation of outcomes to be identically distributed across circumstance types (Lefranc
et al. 2009). To the contrary, a strong criterion of equality of opportunity requires equality
of outcomes conditional on exerting similar levels of effort. For the purpose of formulating
a stronger version of the EOp requirement, we follow Roemer (1998) and identify effort
tranches by the quantiles of the type-specific income distributions. Hence, i and j are
part of the same effort tranche if they both sit at the q-th quantile of their respective type
income distribution.20 Compensation requires to equalize outcomes in each effort tranche,
18In contrast, the “opportunity-sensitive poverty” measures proposed by Brunori et al. (2013) do not
have this property. Since the EOp principle is a mere weighting factor for incomes below the poverty
line, the measure does not detect any violations of the EOp principle once the FfP principle is satisfied.
19In addition to varying the conceptualizations of EOp and FfP, our measurement approach allows us
to introduce other normative foundations for inequality aversion. These may include affluence aversion
due to concerns about political capture by income elites (Piketty 2014) and the emergence of concentrated
market structures in which massive returns accrue to an increasingly small number of “superstar” agents
(Ko¨nig 2019; Autor et al. 2020). While a precise formulation of these normative concerns is beyond the
scope of this paper, we briefly illustrate in Supplementary Material A.4 how additional inequality aversion
may be introduced into our framework. Furthermore, we show in Supplementary Material A.5 how the
heterogeneity in individual needs could be integrated based on individual-specific deprivation thresholds.
20This “Roemerian Identification Assumption” relies on a relative conception of effort. The distribution
of absolute effort like the propensity to study or to work long hours may vary across circumstance types.
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and hence to equalize all moments of the type-specific income distributions. As such, the
strong conceptualization of EOp contrasts with the weak conceptualization embodied in
our baseline measure since the latter required equalizing one moment of the type income
distributions only. Furthermore, note that the satisfaction of strong EOp implies the
satisfaction of weak EOp.
Second, the baseline norm evaluates type-specific opportunity sets by reference to the
average incomes of all i ∈ T (ω). Moreover, the (non-)poor fraction of the population is
identified by evaluating incomes in a counterfactual income distribution that corrects for
unequal opportunities across circumstance types. The baseline norm thus treats EOp and
FfP as non-separable in their scope of application: The assessment of type advantages
(EOp) depends on both poor and non-poor individuals, whereas the identification of
poverty (FfP) depends on the counterfactual income an individual would obtain in an
opportunity-egalitarian world. In contrast to this conceptualization, one may claim that
the requirements of EOp and FfP operate on separate supports of the income distribution
Y e. While FfP characterizes the normative requirement for P , i.e. for people with incomes
below ymin, the distributional ideal of EOp only applies toR, i.e. to those individuals whose
basic needs are satisfied. According to such an argument the normative principles of EOp
and FfP are separable in their scope of application.
While our baseline measure adheres to weak EOp and non-separability, we can con-
struct alternative measures by invoking either strong EOp or separability, or both. These
three alternatives are presented in Table 1. Detailed expositions of their construction are
provided in Supplementary Material A and comparative statics are shown in Supplemen-
tary Material B.
The main features of the alternatives are as follows: First, alternatives (a) and (c) are
based on strong EOp. Hence, under the assumption of non-separability (separability) the
proportionality requirement for raising funds in the non-deprivation set refers to average
However, the focus on type-specific quantile distributions forces the type-specific effort distributions to
be equal. Hence, the absolute effort exertion of individuals is evaluated relative to the distribution of
efforts within their circumstance type.
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Table 1 – Overview Alternative Conceptualizations
Weak/Strong Separability Norm Distribution
Baseline Weak No yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
ymin + (yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) (µe−ymin)NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
Alternative (a) Strong No yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
ymin + (µeS(θ) − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR(Θ)
N
(µeR(Θ)−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
Alternative (b) Weak Yes yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩ P , ∀ ω ∈ Ω
ymin + (yei − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeT (ω)∩R−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω
Alternative (c) Strong Yes yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ P , ∀ θ ∈ Θ
ymin + (µeS(θ)∩R − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ
tranche incomes in excess of the deprivation threshold, µeS(θ)−ymin (µeS(θ)∩R−ymin), instead
of individual incomes yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
−ymin (yei−ymin). All else equal, one would expect the measures
based on strong EOp to yield higher levels of unfair inequality. Second, alternatives (b)
and (c) operate on the assumption of separability. Therefore, individuals are not assigned
to the deprived and non-deprived fractions of society based on the counterfactual income
distributions of a weakly (strongly) opportunity-egalitarian society – indicated by P(ω)
and R(ω) (P(θ) and R(θ)) – but based on the actual income distribution – indicated
by P and R. All else equal, one would expect the measures based on the separability
assumption to yield lower levels of unfair inequality.
4 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
To illustrate the proposed measure of unfair inequality we provide two empirical ap-
plications. First, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to analyze the
development of unfair inequality in the US over the time period 1969-2014. Second, we
combine the PSID and the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
to conduct a cross-sectional analysis in which we benchmark unfair inequality in the US
against unfair inequality in 31 European countries in 2010.21
21Note that much of the recent literature on inequality trends draws on administrative data sources
(Burkhauser et al. 2012). However, in the context of this study survey data such as the PSID or EU-SILC
provide important advantages since the operationalization of EOp and FfP requires detailed information
on individual background characteristics and an accurate representation of the lower tail of the income
distribution. Administrative data is restricted in both dimensions since tax returns collect only basic
demographic information and because the bottom half of the distribution pays little personal income tax.
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4.1 Unfair Inequality in the US over Time
Data Source. The PSID is a main resource for the study of inequality, poverty and
intergenerational transmission processes in the US (see Johnson et al. 2018; Smeeding
2018, and the overview articles in the same issue). At its inception in 1968 the PSID
consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,930 families and an oversample of 1,872
low-income families that are tracked until the present day. All individuals who leave their
original households automatically become independent units in the PSID sampling frame.
To match compositional changes of the US population through post-1968 immigration
flows, the PSID added a Latino sample and an immigrant sample in its 1990 and 1997
waves, respectively.22 Starting in 1997 it has switched from an annual to a biennial
survey rhythm. In its most recent waves, the PSID covers the members of more than 9,000
families and provides rich information on their incomes, family background characteristics
and living practices.
In this study we focus on individuals aged 25-60 over the survey (income reference)
periods 1970-2015 (1969-2014).23 We will now briefly outline the construction of the
inputs to our inequality measure: Y e, Ω, Θ, and ymin. Further detail on the construction
of all relevant variables as well as descriptive statistics are disclosed in Supplementary
Materials C and E.
Outcome Variable. To assess the distribution of economic resources from a fairness
perspective, we use the income components created by the PSID Cross-National Equiv-
alence File (CNEF) to define annual disposable household income as the sum of total
household income from labor, asset flows, windfall gains, private transfers, public trans-
22We exclude the Latino sample from our investigation as it was dropped in 1995 and did not reflect
the full range of post-1968 immigrants.
23We employ cross-sectional sample weights for all calculations. However, one may worry that infre-
quent PSID updates for compositional changes in the US population distort comparisons over time. To
address such concerns, we calculate population weights for 48 age-sex-race-cells (8× 2× 3) in the Annual
Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS-ASEC) and rescale the provided
PSID individual weights to match their CPS-ASEC counterparts. This rescaling has a negligible effect
on our results suggesting that the standard PSID weights do a good job in representing the underlying
US population.
24
fers, private retirement income and social security pensions. We deduct total household
taxes as calculated by the NBER TAXSIM calculator (Butrica and Burkhauser 1997).
Our measure of unfairness puts a strong emphasis on the lower end of the income
distribution. It is well-known that poverty estimates based on survey data tend to be up-
ward biased due to the under-reporting of government benefit receipts (Meyer and Mittag
2019; Mittag 2019). Furthermore, it has been shown that households with extremely
low reported incomes tend to misreport their income from earnings (Brewer et al. 2017;
Meyer et al. 2019). To mitigate distortions from benefit under-reporting we use the time
series provided in Meyer et al. (2015) to scale reported public transfers by a year-specific
under-reporting factor that is calculated based on a comparison between the aggregate
level of benefits receipts reported in the PSID and the aggregate expenditure levels from
administrative program data. To cushion distortions from the under-reporting of labor
incomes we identify individuals that report zero earnings but non-zero working hours in
the reporting period. We then replace their reported earnings level by a prediction from
a Mincer wage regression, and adjust household labor income by the sum of these cor-
rection values over all household members. In total only about 1% of our person-year
observations are affected by this imputation procedure.
To account for differences in need and standard of living by household composition
we scale all household incomes by the modified OECD equivalence scale. For the sake
of inter-period and between-country comparisons we deflate all income figures with the
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment factors for household consumption provided
by the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015). Lastly, we curb the influence of outliers
by winsorizing at the 1st and the 99.5th-percentile of the year-specific income distribution.
Circumstance Types and Effort Tranches. In an equal-opportunity society there
are no differences in outcomes across individuals with different circumstance character-
istics but comparable levels of effort. Our measure of unfairness therefore requires to
partition the population into circumstance types. Thereby a tension arises. On the one
hand, the more parsimonious the type partition, the more we underestimate the influence
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of individual circumstances on life outcomes (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). On the other
hand, limited degrees of freedom suggest restrictions on the granularity of the type par-
tition to avoid noisy estimates of the relevant type parameters. In this work we use four
circumstance variables to partition the population into a maximum of 36 circumstance
types.24 First, we include the biological sex of the respondent. Second, we include a
binary indicator differentiating among non-Hispanic white individuals and the remaining
population. Third, we construct a categorical variable based on whether the highest ed-
ucated parent (i) dropped out of secondary education, (ii) attained a secondary school
degree, or (iii) acquired at least some tertiary education. Lastly, we proxy the occupa-
tional status of parents by grouping them in (i) elementary occupations, (ii) semi-skilled
occupations, or (iii) skilled occupations. These are standard circumstances used in the
empirical literature on inequality of opportunity. However, we present sensitivity analyses
based on alternative type partitions in section 5.2.
Replacing our baseline notion of weak EOp with strong EOp additionally requires
the identification of effort tranches. To this end, we further partition each type-specific
income distribution into 20 quantiles and replace individual incomes with the within-
type average of their respective effort tranche. Hence, for each year we perform our
calculations on a maximum population of 36× 20 cells, where each cell represents a par-
ticular circumstance-effort combination. In Figure S.3 we show that this standardization
of income distributions has a negligible impact on conventional inequality and poverty
measures in the time period of interest.
Minimum Threshold. The specification of poverty thresholds that allow for meaning-
ful comparisons over time and across countries is a topic of widespread academic debate.
For example, the official US poverty line is based on expenditure data from the 1950s to
reflect three times the cost of a well-balanced diet. Since then it has been updated only by
24Brunori et al. (2018) use machine learning techniques to find the optimal type partition for the same
set of European countries that are used for our second empirical application, see section 4.2. Their results
suggest that type partitions with more than 40 types tend to overfit the data. We therefore adhere to a
threshold of 36 types.
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inflation adjustments without taking account of potential changes in the needs of different
family types (Meyer and Sullivan 2012). The international poverty line of the World Bank
is currently set at $1.90 per capita and day in PPP-adjusted dollars. In view of its low
value it is criticized for being irrelevant in countries outside of the developing world (Allen
2017). Lastly, both EU and OECD define relative poverty lines as a fraction of median
equivalized disposable household income. Poverty measurement based on relative lines,
however, may react to changes in the upper percentiles of the distribution irrespective of
changes in the shortfall of those in need from what is required to make ends meet (Foster
1998).
For our baseline estimates we rely on a revised set of international poverty lines as
calculated by Jolliffe and Prydz (2016) in a two-step procedure. First, they match official
national poverty headcounts to the PovcalNet expenditure data of the World Bank and
calculate the implied poverty thresholds. Second, they group the resulting range of na-
tional poverty lines according to indicators of economic development and take the group
median as an internationally comparable poverty line for the respective class of countries.
Their procedure recovers the $1.90 line for the least developed economies but yields more
relevant poverty thresholds for economically advanced countries. In our baseline estimate,
we take their set of national poverty lines and group countries in quintiles of PPP-adjusted
household final consumption expenditure per capita. For single households in the US, this
procedure yields a PPP-adjusted poverty line of $12,874 annually that we hold constant
(in real terms) over the period of our analysis. Sensitivity analyses based on alternative
poverty thresholds are presented in section 5.3.
Baseline Results. Figure 1 displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US
over the time period 1969-2014. The upper line shows the development of total inequal-
ity as measured by the divergence of the empirical income distribution from a perfectly
outcome egalitarian distribution in which yri = µe, ∀ i ∈ N . The time series replicates
the well-documented pattern of inequality development in the US (among others Heath-
cote et al. 2010a; Burkhauser et al. 2012; Piketty et al. 2018): Slight inequality decreases
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throughout the 1970s are followed by strong inequality increases in the 1980s. This trend
continues until the present day, most notably interrupted by the economic crises following
the burst of the dot-com bubble at the turn of the century and the global financial crisis
in the late 2000s.
Figure 1 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
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Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014. (Unfair) inequality
is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the
MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The shaded areas show
bootstrapped 95-% confidence intervals based on 500 draws.
The lower blue line displays the development of unfair inequality as measured by
the divergence of the empirical income distribution from a norm distribution in which the
ideals of EOp and FfP are realized to their full extent (see equation 16). It is unsurprising
that unfair inequality remains at a much lower level than total inequality as the latter
provides an upper bound for the former in any given country at any given point in time.
However, it is noteworthy that unfair inequality seems to follow a similar time trend as
total inequality. Starting with decreases of unfair inequality until 1980, we observe a
steady increase of unfairness until the present day and downward movements that are
largely coincidental with economic downturns.
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The intermediate black line shows the share of total inequality that is in violation of
EOp and FfP. It is calculated as the ratio between unfair inequality and total inequality
and converted into percentage terms. Starting from a level of approximately 20% in 1969,
unfair inequality drops to a share of 15% until 1980. This development suggests that the
observed decreases in inequality over the 1970s were accompanied by an even stronger
reduction of unfair inequality. In spite of an inequality increase by approximately 50%
in the 1980s, the share of inequality attributable to violations of EOp and FfP remained
roughly stable at this level until 1990. While the subsequent two decades are characterized
by a more erratic pattern, we also note that unfair inequality follows a steeper growth
curve than total inequality. Starting at a level of around 16% in 1990, the unfair share
of inequality climbs to levels of close to 21% in the mid 2000s and stalls at a level of
approximately 19% in the latest period of observation. Some may be surprised by the
low relative share of unfair inequality. However, we emphasize that our measures are
based on disposable household income and therefore evaluate the remaining unfairness
after taking transfers through existing welfare state institutions as well as redistribution
within households into account.25
Decomposition. To develop a better understanding for the observed inequality trends,
we conduct a Shapley value decomposition (Shorrocks 2012) to identify the contributions
of the different components that underpin our normative principles. That is, we quantify
the contributions of FfP and EOp, respectively. Furthermore, we decompose the latter
into the contributions from the circumstance characteristics biological sex, race, parental
education, and parental occupation. This decomposition furthermore allows us to embed
our measure of unfairness into the larger literature branches on US trends in poverty,
gender income gaps, racial disparities, and social mobility.
The Shapley value procedure quantifies the contribution of each of the aforementioned
factors by calculating the average marginal decline in unfair inequality once we eliminate
25Moreover, it is well understood in the empirical literature that standard estimates of inequality of
opportunity provide only lower bounds of their true value (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Hufe et al. 2017).
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it from our calculations. For example, one could quantify the marginal impact of FfP on
unfair inequality by decreasing ymin from our baseline threshold of $12,874 to $0. Anal-
ogously, one could quantify the marginal impact of biological sex by excluding it from
the list of variables that define our type partition. However, in both steps the estimate
of the marginal impact depends on the specification of the remaining normative criteria.
To avoid such path-dependencies, we estimate the individual contribution of each factor
by averaging their marginal impacts on unfair inequality across all possible elimination
sequences (Shorrocks 2012). The results of this decomposition are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
Decomposition
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays a decomposition of unfair inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014. (Unfair) inequality is
calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD
for total inequality. The decomposition is based on the Shapley value procedure proposed in Shorrocks (2012).
At the end of the 1960s, approximately half of unfair inequality, that is 10% of total
inequality, could be attributed to violations of the FfP principle. The previously described
attenuation of relative unfairness in the 1970s can be almost exclusively attributed to
decreased violations of the FfP principle. While EOp shows only a slightly decreasing
trend over the 1970s, the contribution of FfP to total inequality is halved, dropping from
0.014 points (10%) to 0.007 points (5%). Following the sharp decreases of the 1970s, the
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contribution of FfP bounces back to its initial levels in the 1980s and subsequently follows
a by and large flat time trend that persists until the present day.26 In 2014, violations of
FfP contribute 0.014 points to our measure of unfairness and explain roughly 5% of total
inequality.
At first glance, our results on poverty are in line with official statistics that also
show a flat time trend in poverty rates across the period of investigation (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 2019). However, the official poverty concept in the US differs from ours
in important aspects such that this analogy only holds superficially. Official poverty
statistics rely on the poverty headcount ratio applied to an annually adjusted poverty
line that is based on the pre-government income of families. To the contrary, we apply a
time-constant absolute poverty threshold to disposable household income after taxes and
transfers and measure poverty as a linear combination of the poverty gap ratio and the
Watts index (Section 3). In fact, applying the headcount ratio to our income concept
and the time-constant poverty line, we find that the share of poor individuals drops by
more than 40% over time (Figure S.7 and Table S.4).27 However, while the share of poor
households has constantly decreased over time the intensity of poverty as measured by the
poverty gap ratio and the Watts index has first decreased in the 1970s and then rebounded
since the mid-1990s. As a consequence, we also find a relatively constant poverty trend
over time, but for different reasons than the official US government statistics.
The stable poverty trend, however, is superseded by marked increases in the violations
of EOp. After slight decreases in the 1970s, the EOp contribution to total inequality
increases from 10% in 1980, over 12% (14%) in 1990 (2000) to 14% in the latest period
of observation.
Analyzing the EOp component in further detail, we note that the contribution of bi-
ological sex to overall inequality is negligible and hovers around the 1%-mark in relative
26Note that while the absolute contribution of FfP is rather stable between 1969 and 2014, its relative
contribution is halved from 10% to 5%. However, this decrease in the relative contribution follows
mechanically from the increase in total inequality. For further illustration, see also Figure S.6 in which
we fit locally smoothed time trends for the relative contributions of both EOp and FfP.
27See Wimer et al. (2016) for similar results.
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terms. Hence, our measure does not reflect the well-documented decrease in earnings
differences between males and females (Blau and Kahn 2017). This deviation is not un-
expected and follows from our focus on disposable household income. Accounting for
resource sharing at the household level evens out any intra-household inequality among
males and females. As such, all our results on biological sex are driven by single-headed
households. Within this group the flat time trend in the contribution of sex-based differ-
ences to total inequality can be rationalized by two countervailing forces that are displayed
in Figure S.8. First, income differences among male and female-headed single households
have been decreasing over the time period 1969-2014. Second, the prevalence of single-
headed households has been steadily increasing for both males and females. While the first
trend depresses the contribution of sex-based differences to total inequality, the second
trend magnifies the remaining differences leading to relatively time-constant contributions
of this component to unfairness in the US.28
In analogy to biological sex, the contribution of race to unfairness in the US is largely
stagnant at approximately 0.007 points across the time period of observation. In relative
terms the contribution of race slightly decreases from 4% to 3%, again reflecting the
marked increase of total inequality. This flat trend echoes previous findings that there
has been little progress in closing the black-white earnings gap since the 1970s (Bayer and
Charles 2018; Derenoncourt and Montialoux 2019).29
With the contributions from sex- and race-based differences rather constant over time,
the witnessed increase of the EOp component is entirely driven by the increased im-
portance of parental background variables – namely parental education and occupation.
While these factors jointly contributed 0.009 points (6%) in 1969, their importance has
tripled to 0.028 points (10%) in 2014. Interpreting the covariances between parental ed-
ucation and occupation and individual income as a proxy for social mobility, our findings
suggest that the US has become increasingly immobile in the time period from 1969
28See also Lundberg et al. (2016) on the interaction between changing gender gaps, family structures
and the intergenerational transmission of advantages.
29See also Figure S.9 for complementary evidence on the stability of non-white disposable income gaps
in our data.
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to 2014. This finding is in line with Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) and Davis and
Mazumder (2019) who find that the intergenerational elasticity of income has declined
for cohorts entering the labor market after 1980 as well as Hilger (2019) who documents
a similar time trend for educational mobility. However, we note that the assessment of
intergenerational mobility trends in the US is contentious. In contrast to the previously
cited works, Lee and Solon (2009), Chetty et al. (2014b), and Song et al. (2019) conclude
that intergenerational mobility has stayed constant over the time period of investigation.
The disparity of results is explained by various drawbacks of the underlying data sources
as well as different measurement choices. While our measurement approach is not strictly
comparable to either of these papers, our results are in line with the first set of works.30
To summarize: In terms of its trend, unfair inequality largely replicates the develop-
ment of total inequality in the US. However, due to marked decreases in poverty, unfairness
showed an even stronger decrease than total inequality in the 1970s. To the contrary, the
steeper growth of unfair inequality since the 1990s is almost exclusively attributable to
increased violations of the EOp principle and the growing importance of parental back-
ground variables in particular.
4.2 Cross-Country Differences in Unfair Inequality
Data Source. For the purpose of an international comparison we combine the PSID
with the 2011 wave of EU-SILC. EU-SILC serves as the official database for monitoring
30Mobility measures can be decomposed into i) the copula of parental background characteristics and
child outcomes, and ii) the marginal distributions of child outcomes and parental background character-
istics, respectively (Chetty et al. 2014b). Rank-mobility measures such as intergenerational correlations
(IGC) and rank-rank correlations depend on i) while holding ii) constant. To the contrary, mobility
measures like the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) allow for changes in ii). Clearly, our measurement
approach is closer to the second class as we compare different marginal distributions in the parent and
the child generation that we allow to change over time. However, our measure differs from a typical IGE
estimate in at least three important dimensions. i) We model child income as a function of parental edu-
cation and occupation instead of parental income. ii) We summarize persistence by calculating inequality
in a predicted distribution instead of interpreting regression parameters. iii) Child outcomes refer to
annual incomes at various points of the life-cycle instead of modeling them so as to mimic lifetime income
(Nybom and Stuhler 2016). To provide a closer analogy to standard IGE estimates we re-estimate our
measure of unfairness for different age groups at different points in time while excluding all determinants
of unfairness except for parental background characteristics. The results, displayed in Figure S.10, sug-
gest that relative mobility has decreased at all points of the individual life-cycle with more pronounced
changes at older ages. This pattern is consistent with earnings profiles that fan out over the life-cycle.
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inequality, poverty and social exclusion in the EU (see for example Atkinson et al. (2017)
and the references cited therein) and covers a total of 31 countries.31 We use the 2011
cross-sectional wave as it contains a special survey module on parental background infor-
mation that allows us to construct types from a broad range of circumstance variables.32
As in the PSID, incomes are reported for the year preceding the survey leading to 2010
as the year of our cross-sectional comparison. The data preparation closely follows the
procedures outlined for the PSID. Further detail on the variable construction as well as
descriptive statistics are provided in Supplementary Materials C and E.
Outcome Variable. We construct disposable household income as the sum of total
household income from labor, asset flows, private transfers, public transfers, private re-
tirement income and social security pensions, and deduct taxes on wealth (if applicable),
income and social security contributions. In analogy to the PSID, we scale reported public
transfers by a country-specific under-reporting factor and adjust labor incomes by imput-
ing individual labor incomes of respondents with zero labor incomes but non-zero working
hours. Only about 1% of respondents are affected by the latter imputation. Furthermore,
we deflate household incomes by the modified OECD equivalence scale, adjust for pur-
chasing power parities and winsorize country-specific income distributions at the 1st and
99.5th percentiles.
Circumstance Types and Effort Tranches. For each country we partition the pop-
ulation based on the following circumstance characteristics: i) biological sex, ii) migration
background, iii) educational achievement of the highest educated parent, and iv) the high-
est occupation category of either parent. While circumstances i), iii), and iv) mirror the
PSID specification, we replace the binary race variable of the PSID with a binary indi-
31The sample consists of Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY),
Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), Finland
(FI), France (FR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Malta (MT),
Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal
(PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), and the United Kingdom (UK).
32In contrast to the PSID, EU-SILC consists of rotating panels and each household stays in the data
for only 4 years. Hence, one cannot use the panel dimension to construct circumstance variables.
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cator for whether respondents were born in their current country of residence. In total
we partition the population into 36 circumstance types which we again subdivide into 20
quantiles to identify effort tranches. As evidenced in Figure S.3 this transformation is
innocuous with respect to cross-country comparisons of inequality and poverty statistics.
Minimum Threshold. Internationally comparable absolute poverty thresholds are
again constructed based on the procedure suggested by Jolliffe and Prydz (2016). 21
out of the 31 European countries belong to the highest quintile of countries in terms of
PPP-adjusted household final consumption expenditures per capita and are hence charac-
terized by the same poverty threshold as the US: $12,874 per annum (PPP-adj.). However,
10 Eastern European countries only belong to the second highest quintile and are therefore
characterized by a lower poverty threshold of $3,957 per annum (PPP-adj.).
Baseline Results. Figure 3 replicates Figure 1 for the cross-country comparison. The
red diamonds indicate total inequality, the blue squares unfair inequality. The black
hollow circles show the relative share of unfair inequality. Countries are ordered from
left to right by their level of total inequality. The dashed vertical line separates the
European countries from the US sample. Acknowledging the special role of the Southern
states in terms of intergenerational transmission processes (Chetty et al. 2014a; Bratberg
et al. 2017) and poverty prevalence (Ziliak 2006), we also provide results separating the
South of the US from the rest of the country (Northeast, Midwest, West) based on the
census region groupings of the US Census Bureau.
The US are by far the most unequal society in our country sample with inequality
figures about 25% higher than the most unequal European societies. At the other end of
the spectrum we find Norway, Iceland and Belgium. The most unfair societies in 2010
are Greece, the US, Spain, Italy, and Romania closely followed by Portugal. Treating the
South of the US as a separate country, it would attain the highest level of unfairness of all
countries. In relative terms, EOp and FfP explain roughly 25% of total inequality in the
European countries of this group – even 35% in Greece. The US attains an unfair share
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Figure 3 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays cross-country differences in (unfair) inequality in 2010. Data points to the left of the vertical
dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to the right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions.
(Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which
corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The
shaded areas show bootstrapped 95-% confidence intervals based on 500 draws.
of approximately 19%. The lower unfairness share of the US follows mechanically from
its higher levels of total inequality. The group of countries with the least extent of unfair
inequality consists of Scandinavian countries plus the Netherlands. It is important to
emphasize that country rankings differ depending on whether we analyze total inequality
or unfairness. While for example Belgium is among the top three countries of least total
inequality, it is not among the top ten countries of least unfair inequality.
Decomposition. The US differs markedly from its European counterparts in terms the
processes that determine unfair inequality. Figure 4 shows the results of a Shapley value
decomposition of unfair inequality into its different components.
In the European group of countries with the highest unfairness (Greece, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Italy), violations of the FfP principle consistently explain more than
half of the detected unfair inequality. 2010 marks a peak year of the European sovereign
debt crisis, and Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy were among the countries most affected
by it. To highlight the differential impact of the economic crisis on unfairness in Europe
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Figure 4 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
Decomposition
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays a decomposition of cross-country differences in unfair inequality in 2010. Data points to the left
of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to the right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its
census regions. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN,
α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. The decomposition is based on the Shapley value procedure proposed in Shorrocks
(2012).
and the US, we calculate the difference between the Watts index and the poverty gap
ratio for the six most unfair societies in our country sample (Greece, US, Spain, Italy,
Romania, Portugal) from 2006 to 2014. Since the FfP component nests the difference
between these two poverty measures, it can be interpreted as a proxy statistic for the
longitudinal development of FfP in these countries. The results are displayed in Figure
S.11. Romania is the least economically developed country in the considered country
group. In Romania the financial crisis ended a trend of decreasing poverty and led to
increased violations of the FfP principle in its aftermath. Similarly, in the group of
Southern European countries the FfP proxy increases markedly after 2008. This evidence
suggests that the high levels of unfair inequality among the European countries in 2010
followed from the economic downturn that accompanied the financial crisis and which in
turn led to increased violations of the FfP principle.
In contrast to the European group, the difference between Watts index and poverty
gap ratio is completely flat in the US over the crisis years. Instead, Figure 4 shows that
unfairness in the US is strongly driven by the EOp component. This difference is not
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caused by the differential importance of biological sex. Due to our focus on disposable
household income, income differences across the sexes have a negligible impact on unfair
inequality in Europe and the US alike. Neither is this difference a mere consequence of
replacing the race indicator with the immigration background indicator. Even abstracting
from the migration/race circumstance, the US would be characterized by the highest
degree of unequal opportunities in our country sample. It is the contributions of parental
education and occupation that are the highest among all countries under consideration
and place the US among the most unfair societies in our country sample. In line with the
findings of Chetty et al. (2014a) and Hilger (2019) the lack of social mobility is particularly
pronounced in the Southern states of the US. However, even when focusing on the non-
Southern states only, the US ranks among the countries with the highest intergenerational
persistence in our country sample (see also Corak 2013).
5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative norma-
tive assumptions. First, we provide empirical results for all three alternative conceptual-
izations laid out in Table 1.
Second, in principle the measurement approach adopted in this paper takes a neutral
stance on the specification of the model primitives Ω, Θ, and ymin. Hence, it may accom-
modate a wide array of different views on the responsibility cut as well as the appropriate
minimum threshold ymin. Yet, we acknowledge that the precise cut between circumstances
and effort, as well as the choice of ymin are normatively contentious. While it is not the
ambition of this paper to resolve such disagreement, we provide results for alternative
choices of Ω, Θ, and ymin in sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
Third, differences between Y r and Y e may be aggregated by different divergence mea-
sures that put different weights on positive and negative divergences from norm incomes,
respectively. We therefore provide robustness analyses with respect to the use of different
divergence measures in section 5.4.
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For brevity, we only present robustness checks for the longitudinal analysis of the
US in the main body of this paper. However, every sensitivity check is conducted in an
analogous way for the cross-country comparison – see Figures S.12-S.15 and Table S.6 in
the Supplementary Material.
5.1 Alternative Norm Distributions
Our baseline estimates of unfair inequality rely on a measure that is based on a weak con-
ceptualization of EOp and reconciles EOp and FfP in a non-separable way. In Table 1 we
have presented alternative norm distributions that divert from the baseline by operating
on a strong notion of EOp (Alternatives (a) and (c)) and/or assume separability between
EOp and FfP (Alternatives (b) and (c)). Figure 5 presents the development of (unfair)
inequality in the US with the upper line again marking the development of total inequality
and the lower lines marking unfair inequality under each of these different conceptual-
izations. The black line marks the relative share of unfair inequality from our baseline
estimate. The gray area shows the range between the lower and the upper envelope of
the relative share of unfairness according to the alternative measurement specifications.
We note that our conclusions with respect to the time trend of unfair inequality in
the US is robust to the different conceptualizations: A decrease in the relative share of
unfair inequality until 1980 is followed by a stagnation throughout the following decade
and increases throughout the 1990s until the present day. However, level differences exist.
While Alternatives (a) and (c) yield results that are largely congruent to our baseline,
Alternative (b) consistently detects lower levels of unfair inequality than the remaining
measures. This result directly follows from the separability assumption according to which
(i) opportunity sets of circumstance types are evaluated by excess incomes above ymin only,
and ii) excluding empirically poor individuals from compensation through opportunity-
equalizing transfers beyond the poverty line. Both features make the distribution of
type-specific advantages more homogeneous and therefore require less transfers across
types to attain the normatively desirable distribution of incomes. If one prefers the
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Figure 5 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
Alternative Norm Distributions
Total Inequality
Baseline, in %
Range of Alternatives, in %
0
10
20
30
40
Unfair Inequality, in %                                                
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(Unfair) Inequality, MN, α=0                    
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Baseline
Alternative (a)
Alternative (b)
Alternative (c)
Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014 according to the
alternative norm distributions outlined in Table 1. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou
and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are
expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of total inequality
depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
conceptualization of Alternative (b) over our baseline measure, one would conclude that
unfairness amounts to 13% instead of 19% of total inequality in 2014.
5.2 Alternative Responsibility Cuts
Any measurement of a responsibility-sensitive version of egalitarianism requires a stance
on the features of life for which people should be held responsible. In our baseline esti-
mates we assume that people should not be held responsible for i) their biological sex,
ii) their race, iii) the occupation of their parents, and iv) the education of their parents.
However, there may be further characteristics beyond individual control that evoke nor-
mative concern. Examples could be the quality of neighborhoods in which people grew up
(Chetty et al. 2016), parenting practices (Doepke et al. 2019) or even genetic endowments
(Papageorge and Thom 2019).
To be sure, the PSID puts strong constraints on testing the influence of different
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circumstance characteristics.33 We therefore proceed as follows: First, we extract two
additional circumstances that are consistently measured across the period of our analysis:
i) the census region in which respondents grew up, and ii) the migration background of
parents. We convert both variables into a vector of binary indicators and add them to our
set of circumstances. Second, we repeat our analysis for all circumstance combinations
that yield the same number of types as in our baseline analysis (36 types).34 Hence,
we repeat our analysis for 210 different specifications of Ω. The results are presented
in Figure 6, where each black cross represents a different specification of Ω in any given
year. The black line again marks the relative share of unfair inequality from our baseline
estimate while the gray area shows the range between the lower and the upper envelope of
the relative share of unfairness according to the alternative measurement specifications.
Our conclusions with respect to the time trend of unfair inequality in the US remains
unaffected by the specification of Ω. However, we again register level differences depending
on the factors for which we hold people responsible. According to the most conservative
specification of Ω, unfair inequality in the US amounts to roughly 12% of total inequality
in 2014 (with the upper range being 20%). We acknowledge that the alternative circum-
stance information in the PSID remains limited to geographical and migration background
information. EU-SILC avails a broader range of circumstance characteristics from differ-
ent domains that are consistently elicited across all sample countries. These include i)
the relationship status of parents, ii) the number of siblings, iii) the financial situation of
the parental household, as well as iv) property ownership of parents. We again test 210
different specifications of Ω for the EU-SILC countries holding the maximum number of
types constant at 36. However, Figure S.13 reveals that in spite of level differences the
33The PSID has introduced the Child and Development Supplement (CDS) in 1997 with follow-up
waves in 2002/03 and 2007/08. The CDS provides very detailed information on the living environments
of 3,563 children aged 0-12 in the initial wave. However, even the oldest children from the 1997 CDS
cohort are only now in their early 30s – an age that is commonly believed to be the minimum threshold
to approximate long-term earnings potential. Respecting sensible age thresholds and due to sample
attrition over time, the CDS sample is too small to exploit its richer circumstance information for the
income decompositions that underlie our empirical analysis – see also our discussion in section 4.1.
34We keep the granularity of the type partition constant to ensure the comparability to our baseline
results and to balance the concerns for underestimating the influence of circumstances and noisy estimates
of the relevant type parameters – see also our discussion in section 4.1.
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Figure 6 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014 according to
alternative specifications of the circumstance set Ω. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou
and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are
expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of total inequality
depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
general conclusions from our cross-country comparison remain robust to this broader set
of alternative circumstance characteristics.
Another normative assumption relates to the correlation between circumstances Ω and
efforts Θ. In our baseline measure we treat the correlation between both components as
morally objectionable. For example, part of the income gap between whites and non-
whites can be explained by differences in educational attainment (Gelbach 2016) which
itself is at least partially under the control of individuals. Circumstances thus exert a
direct and an indirect effect on life outcomes. While in our baseline we follow Roemer
(1998) and consider both effects as normatively objectionable, others have suggested to
hold people responsible for effort and preference variables regardless of how they are
formed (Barry 2005). To test the sensitivity of our baseline results to this alternative
normative stance, we repeat our analysis while partialling out the indirect effect that
circumstances exert through individual efforts. To this end, we consider two variables
that are partially under the control of individuals and highly predictive of incomes – i)
educational attainment, and ii) annual working hours – and clean circumstances from their
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correlation with these effort variables before repeating our analysis.35 If circumstances
had no impact independent of the considered efforts, we would see a sharp drop of unfair
inequality in comparison to our baseline results.
Figure 7 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
Accounting for Preferences
Total Inequality
Range of Alternatives, in %
Baseline, in %
Net-of-Efforts
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014 according to
alternative treatments of the correlation between the effort set Θ and the circumstance set Ω. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the
divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality.
Relative measures of unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality
in percent (in %) of total inequality depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
Figure 7 shows the differences between our baseline and the alternative responsibility
cut. We note a moderation of the previously described time trend when holding people
responsible for the correlation between circumstances Ω and efforts Θ. In contrast to
our baseline, unfair inequality starts at higher levels in 1969 and increases much more
moderately in the 1990s. Combining this moderation of the time trend in absolute unfair
inequality with the increasing slope of total inequality, the relative share of unfairness
decreases over time and remains slightly above the 15%-mark in 2014. The differential
development of our baseline and the alternative measure is consistent with evidence on
increasing college wage premia (Heathcote et al. 2010b), longer working hours among the
35We describe the exact steps of this procedure in Supplementary Material F.
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highly educated (Fuentes and Leamer 2019) and the increasing stratification of college
completion by parental background characteristics (Davis and Mazumder 2019; Hilger
2019). Once we shut down educational attainment and working hours as channels of
circumstance influence, unfairness does no longer reflect the growing importance of these
factors for the determination of incomes over time.
5.3 Alternative Minimum Thresholds
There is no clear consensus on how to set an income threshold that captures the material
requirements of what it takes to make ends meet. Acknowledging the arbitrariness of any
threshold, Foster (1998) suggests to move beyond normative and empirical disagreements
on the correct value of ymin and to show the robustness of the main conclusions based
on different plausible specifications of ymin instead. In this spirit we provide alternative
measures of unfair inequality based on four different poverty lines. First, Allen (2017)
uses a linear programming approach to calculate the PPP-adjusted minimal cost of a basic
needs consumption basket containing food to satisfy nutritional requirements, as well as
fuel for heating, clothing and shelter for different climatic regions of the world. For the
four countries overlapping with our sample (US, Lithuania, UK, France) he calculates an
average basic needs poverty (BNP) line of $3.96 (PPP-adj.) per capita and day which
we apply to all countries and years in our sample. Second, we repeat our analysis by
using the official country-year-specific national poverty lines of the US Census Bureau
and EUROSTAT. Third, we calculate relative poverty lines based on the suggestions
of the OECD and EUROSTAT. While the OECD proposes a poverty line at 50% of
the median equivalized disposable household income, EUROSTAT proposes an at-risk-of-
poverty (AROP) line at 60% of the median of the same distribution.36 The results for
these different poverty thresholds are shown in Figure 8.
We note that our general conclusions with respect to the trend of unfairness in the
36Note that the official poverty statistics of EUROSTAT are also calculated by reference to the AROP
threshold. The AROP lines presented in this work differ nevertheless from the national poverty lines
provided by EUROSTAT since we calculate them by observing the sample restrictions and variable
definitions used in this paper.
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Figure 8 – Unfair Inequality in the US, 1969-2014
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of (unfair) inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014 according to
alternative specifications of the poverty threshold ymin. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou
and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are
expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of total inequality depending
on the alternative measurement specifications. The construction of the alternative minimum thresholds is discussed in Supplementary Material
C.
US are insensitive to the specification of the poverty threshold. If anything, the relative
poverty thresholds of the OECD and AROP tend to magnify the relative increase of
unfairness since the 1990s. However, unsurprisingly we observe sharp level differences
in unfair inequality depending on the stringency of the poverty threshold. Proponents
of the AROP threshold ($18,737) would conclude that unfairness explained 25% of total
inequality in the US in 2014, while proponents of the BNP ($1,445) threshold would detect
a relative share of 14%.
5.4 Alternative Divergence Measures
Our baseline measure of unfair inequality employs the divergence measure proposed by
Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0. In addition to alternations in the weighting
parameter α, we now present results based on the measures put forward by Cowell (1985)
and Alma˚s et al. (2011). The family put forward by Cowell (1985) is another generalization
of the entropy class of inequality indexes that varies with an inequality aversion parameter
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α. The Cowell-family and the MN-family coincide exactly for α = 1. Moreover, we
employ the unfairness Gini proposed by Alma˚s et al. (2011) which tends to put relatively
less weight on large negative divergences from the reference distribution.
In spite of their differences, all measures yield highly comparable results in terms of
cross-period comparisons of unfair inequality. Table 2 shows rank-correlations for the
different measures and their parameterizations for the US sample. All correlation coeffi-
Table 2 – Rank Correlation across Years, US
Magdalou and Nock Cowell Alm˚as et al.
α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2
Magdalou and Nock
α = 0 1.00 . . . . . .
α = 1 0.99 1.00 . . . . .
α = 2 0.97 0.99 1.00 . . . .
Cowell
α = 0 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 . . .
α = 1 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 . .
α = 2 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 .
Alm˚as et al.
0.96 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00
Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This table displays rank correlations for unfair inequality across years based on different divergence measures.
Unfair inequality is calculated based on the divergence measures proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011), Cowell (1985), and Alma˚s
et al. (2011).
cients are at a level of at least 0.96. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust to
alternations in the way in which divergences between Y e and Y r are aggregated.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have provided a new measure of unfair inequality that reconciles the
ideals of equality of opportunity (EOp) and freedom from poverty (FfP). In fact, we
provide the first work that combines these widely-endorsed principles of justice into a
joint measure of unfair inequality by treating both as co-equal grounds for compensation.
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Next to illustrating our measurement approach and showcasing its flexibility to various
normative alternations, we provide two empirical applications. First, we analyze the
development of inequality in the US over the time period 1969-2014 from the normative
perspective of our unfairness measure. Second, we provide a corresponding international
comparison between the US and 31 European countries in 2010. In combination, both
analyses yield important implications for current debates on inequality. First, the US
trend in unfair inequality has largely traced the marked increase of total inequality since
the beginning of the 1980s. Second, since the 1990s unfair inequality follows a steeper
growth curve than total inequality. Third, this trend is mainly driven by a less equal
distribution of opportunities across people that face different circumstances beyond their
individual control. Fourth, unfairness in the US shows a remarkably different structure
than in comparable European societies. While unfairness in Europe in 2010 seems to be
largely driven by the consequences of European debt crisis, unfairness in the US is driven
by the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages. The underlying determinants of
the latter are arguably much more persistent than income shortfalls due to economic
downturns which illustrates the enormous challenge presented to policymakers willing to
address unfairness in the US.
While we provide comprehensive robustness checks for our findings, there are short-
comings which suggest a wide avenue for further research. At the empirical level, it
includes addressing the well-known drawbacks of survey data by the use of suitable ad-
ministrative datasets. Furthermore, we have shown in this work that our measurement
approach lends itself to various refinements and extensions with respect to the conceptu-
alization of unfairness. While we were careful to choose our guiding principles to broadly
match the fairness perceptions of a larger public, we look forward to tailor our approach
even stronger to forthcoming empirical evidence on the normative preferences upheld by
individuals.
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A PROOF
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition is trivially true for the (counterfactually) poor
population P(ω) as their norm incomes are prescribed by the FfP condition (13). Fur-
thermore, for each type T (ω) we can use (14) to rewrite yri for the non-poor population
R(ω):
yri = ymin +
yei
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
(yrj − ymin). (25)
We use this expression together with the FfP condition (yri = ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω)) in the
EOp condition (9):
1
NT (ω)
 ∑
i∈P(ω)
ymin +
∑
i∈R(ω)
ymin + y
e
i
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
(yrj − ymin)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrT (ω)
= µe. (26)
We simplify (26) as follows:
ymin +
1
NT (ω)
∑
i∈R(ω)
yrj − ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
(yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) = µe
ymin +
yrj − ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
1
NT (ω)
∑
i∈R(ω)
(yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) = µe
ymin +
yrj − ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω) µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) = µe.
We solve for yrj to obtain the norm income of any j ∈ R(ω):
yrj = ymin + (yej µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) (µ
e − ymin)
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin)
. (27)
As evidenced by (26), µrT (ω) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj
and we know that yrj ∈ (ymin,∞). It is straightforward that µrT (ω) → ymin for yrj → ymin
and µrT (ω) → ∞ for yrj → ∞. Under the assumption that µe > ymin and invoking the
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intermediate value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj for which (26)
holds. Since the choice of i, j ∈ R(ω) was arbitrary, expressions (27) and (15) hold for all
i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > ymin. Assume this was not true, i.e.
µe ≤ ymin. Then, it would still hold that µrT (ω) → ymin for yrj → ymin and µrT (ω) → ∞
for yrj → ∞. Hence, µrT (ω) ∈ (ymin,∞). However, from the EOp requirement (9) we
also know that µrT (ω) = µe. If µe ≤ ymin, either of these statements must be false and
hence ∩4h=1Dh = ∅. Intuitively, if µe ≤ ymin one cannot lift all people above the minimum
threshold (D3), without drawing non-poor people below the minimum threshold (D4),
while maintaining the equal resource requirement (D1).

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A ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
In this appendix we provide the formal derivations of the alternative norm distributions
discussed in section 3.4 and displayed in Table 1. Furthermore, we show how additional
inequality aversion may be introduced into our framework and how to operationalize the
FfP concept based on individual-specific deprivation thresholds.
A.1 Alternative (a).
For this alternative measure we divert from the baseline by replacing weak EOp with
strong EOp. The satisfaction of strong EOp requires the equalization of all moments of
the type-specific income distribution. We therefore reformulate (9) as follows:
D2a =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = 1NS(θ) ∑
j∈S(θ)
yrj = µrS(θ), ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
 . (28)
Since we adhere to non-separability, invoking strong EOp requires a subsequent redef-
inition of the poor and the non-poor fraction of the population. As in the baseline, we
construct a counterfactual income distribution that complies with the EOp principle in
order to identify those below the poverty threshold ymin:
P(θ) =
{
i ∈ S(θ)
∣∣∣∣ yei µeS(θ)yei ≤ ymin
}
, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, (29)
R(θ) =
{
i ∈ S(θ)
∣∣∣∣ yei µeS(θ)yei > ymin
}
, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (30)
Furthermore, we define R(Θ) = ∪hR(θ).
As a consequence, the FfP and the proportionality requirement are formulated with
respect to the counterfactual distribution in which strong EOp is realized:
D3a =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ} , (31)
1
D4a =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yminyrj−ymin = µeS(θ)−yminµeS(θ′)−ymin , ∀ i ∈ R(θ), ∀ j ∈ R(θ′), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
}
. (32)
Invoking strong EOp leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose µe > ymin. Then, the intersection D1 ∩D2a ∩D3a ∩D4a yields a
singleton which defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
ymin + (µeS(θ) − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR(Θ)
N
(µeR(Θ)−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
(33)
Conversely, if µe ≤ ymin, then D1 ∩ D2a ∩ D3a ∩ D4a = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. The
proposition is trivially true for the (counterfactually) poor population P(θ) as their norm
incomes are prescribed by (31). We can use (32) to rewrite yri for the members of tranches
that are non-poor on average and use this expression in the constant resources constraint
(8):
1
N
∑
θ∈Θ
 ∑
i∈P(θ)
ymin +
∑
i∈R(θ)
ymin + µeS(θ) − ymin
µeS(θ′) − ymin
(yrj − ymin)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µr
= µe. (34)
Solving for yrj we obtain:
yrj = ymin + (µeS(θ′) − ymin)
(µe − ymin)
NR(Θ)
N
(µeR(Θ) − ymin)
. (35)
As evidenced by (34), µr is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj and
we know that yrj ∈ (ymin,∞). Under the assumption that µe > ymin and invoking the
intermediate value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj for which (8)
holds. Since the choice of i ∈ R(θ) and j ∈ R(θ′) was arbitrary, expression (33) holds
i ∈ R(θ), j ∈ R(θ′), ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > ymin. Assume this was not true,
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i.e. µe ≤ ymin. Then, it would still hold that µr → ymin for yrj → ymin and µr → ∞ for
yrj → ∞. Hence, µr ∈ (ymin,∞). However, from the constant resources requirement (8)
we also know that µr = µe. If µe < ymin, either of these statements must be false and
hence D1 ∩ D2a ∩ D3a ∩ D4a = ∅. Intuitively, if µe < ymin one cannot lift all people above
the minimum threshold (D3a), without drawing non-poor people below the minimum
threshold (D4a), while maintaining the equal resource requirement (D1). 
A.2 Alternative (b).
For this alternative measure we divert from the baseline by replacing non-separability with
separability. In line with this normative assumption we reformulate the EOp requirement
as follows:
D2b =

d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ 1NT (ω)∩R
∑
i∈T (ω)∩R
yri︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrT (ω)∩R
= 1
NR
∑
j∈R
yej
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin − µeP)
NR
N
(µeR − ymin)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrR
, ∀ ω ∈ Ω

.
(36)
Instead of rating type-specific advantages by µeT (ω), (36) draws on the average excess
income above the poverty line, µrT (ω)∩R, to evaluate opportunity sets. Note that the type-
specific average income above ymin must be equalized with respect to the norm (not the
empirical) income of the rich population. This is a direct consequence of the constant
resource restriction given in (8): Maintaining constant resources it is impossible to satisfy
FfP without reducing the resources of the non-poor fraction R accordingly.
Separability of EOp and FfP entails that the incomes of i ∈ P are compared to a norm
income of ymin, while the gains from opportunity equalization only accrue to i ∈ R. As a
consequence, the FfP and the proportionality requirement are formulated with respect to
the sets P and R instead of their counterfactual analogues P(ω) and R(ω):
D3b =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = ymin, ∀ i ∈ P} , (37)
3
D4b =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yminyrj−ymin = yei−yminyej−ymin , ∀ i, j ∈ T (ω) ∩R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω
}
. (38)
Invoking the separability assumption leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose µe > ymin. Then, the intersection D1 ∩ D2b ∩ D3b ∩ D4b yields a
singleton which defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩ P , ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (yei − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeT (ω)∩R−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
(39)
Conversely, if µe ≤ ymin, then D1 ∩ D2b ∩ D3b ∩ D4b = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof proceeds in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. The
proposition is trivially true for the poor population P as their norm incomes are prescribed
by (37). For each type T (ω) we can use (38) to rewrite yri for the non-poor population
and use this expression in the reformulated EOp condition (36):
1
NT (ω)∩R
 ∑
i∈T (ω)∩R
(
ymin +
yei − ymin
yej − ymin
(yrj − ymin)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrT (ω)∩R
= µrR. (40)
We use the constant resource condition (8) to express µrR in terms of observable quantities:
1
NT (ω)∩R
 ∑
i∈T (ω)∩R
(
ymin +
yei − ymin
yej − ymin
(yrj − ymin)
) = µe − NPN yminNR
N
. (41)
Solving for yrj we obtain:
yrj = ymin + (yej − ymin)
(µe − ymin)
NR
N
(µeT (ω)∩R − ymin)
. (42)
As evidenced by (41), µrT (ω)∩R is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj
and we know that yrj ∈ (ymin,∞). Invoking the proportionality condition (38) it must also
be that µrR > ymin. Under the assumption that µe > ymin and invoking the intermediate
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value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj for which (36) holds. Since the
choice of i, j ∈ T (ω)∩R was arbitrary, expression (39) holds ∀ i, j ∈ T (ω)∩R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > ymin. Assume this was not true, i.e.
µe ≤ ymin. Then, it would still hold that µrT (ω)∩R → ymin for yrj → ymin and µrT (ω)∩R →∞ for
yrj → ∞. Hence, µrT (ω)∩R ∈ (ymin,∞). However, from the reformulated EOp requirement
(36) we also know that µrT (ω)∩R = µrR
(
= (µe − NP
N
ymin)/NRN
)
. If µe ≤ ymin, either of these
statements must be false and hence D1 ∩ D2b ∩ D3b ∩ D4b = ∅. Intuitively, if µe ≤ ymin
one cannot lift all people above the minimum threshold (D3b), without drawing non-
poor people below the minimum threshold (D4b), while maintaining the equal resource
requirement (D1). 
A.3 Alternative (c).
For this alternative measure we divert from the baseline by adhering to both strong EOp
and separability. We therefore reformulate (9) as follows:
D2c =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = 1NS(θ)∩R
∑
j∈S(θ)∩R
yrj = µrS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ
 . (43)
Separability of EOp and FfP entails that the incomes of i ∈ P are compared to a norm
income of ymin, while the gains from opportunity equalization only accrue to i ∈ R. As a
consequence, the FfP and the proportionality requirement are formulated with respect to
the sets P and R instead of a counterfactual analogue:
D3c =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = ymin, ∀ i ∈ P} , (44)
D4c =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yminyrj−ymin = µeS(θ)∩R−yminµeS(θ′)∩R−ymin , ∀ i ∈ R(θ), ∀ j ∈ R(θ′), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
}
. (45)
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Invoking strong EOp and the separability assumption leads to the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 4. Suppose µe > ymin. Then, the intersection D1 ∩ D2c ∩ D3c ∩ D4c yields a
singleton which defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ P , ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
ymin + (µeS(θ)∩R − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
(46)
Conversely, if µe ≤ ymin, then D1 ∩ D2c ∩ D3c ∩ D4c = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. The
proposition is trivially true for the poor population P as their norm incomes are prescribed
by (44). We can use (45) to rewrite yri for the non-poor members of each effort tranche
and use this expression in the constant resources constraint (8):
1
N
∑
θ∈Θ
 ∑
i∈S(θ)∩P
ymin +
∑
i∈S(θ)∩R
ymin + µeS(θ)∩R − ymin
µeS(θ′)∩R − ymin
(yrj − ymin)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µr
= µe. (47)
Solving for yrj we obtain:
yrj = ymin + (µeS(θ′)∩R − ymin)
(µe − ymin)
NR
N
(µeR − ymin)
. (48)
As evidenced by (47), µr is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj and
we know that yrj ∈ (ymin,∞). Under the assumption that µe > ymin and invoking the
intermediate value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj for which (8)
holds. Since the choice of i ∈ S(θ) ∩ R and j ∈ S(θ′) ∩ R was arbitrary, expression (46)
holds for all i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ j ∈ S(θ′) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > ymin. Assume this was not true,
i.e. µe ≤ ymin. Then, it would still hold that µr → ymin for yrj → ymin and µr → ∞ for
yrj → ∞. Hence, µr ∈ (ymin,∞). However, from the constant resources requirement (8)
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we also know that µr = µe. If µe ≤ ymin, either of these statements must be false and
hence D1 ∩ D2c ∩ D3c ∩ D4c = ∅. Intuitively, if µe ≤ ymin one cannot lift all people above
the minimum threshold (D3c), without drawing non-poor people below the minimum
threshold (D4c), while maintaining the equal resource requirement (D1). 
A.4 Additional Progressiveness
We are able to accommodate additional inequality aversion by relaxing the proportionality
assumption and allowing for additional progressiveness in the intra-type distribution of
excess income above ymin. To this end, let us reformulate the proportionality restriction
as follows:
D4d =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yminyrj−ymin =
yei
µe
µeT (ω)
Wi(σ)−ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
Wj(σ)−ymin
, ∀ i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
 , (49)
whereWi(σ) is an income weight subject to the parameter σ ∈ [0, 1] :Wi(σ) =
(
1− σ y
e
i−µeR(ω)
yei
)
.
Accounting for additional inequality aversion in the upper end of the income distribu-
tion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose µe > ymin. Then, the intersection D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3 ∩ D4d yields a
singleton which uniquely defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
Wi(σ)− ymin) (µe−ymin)NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
(50)
Conversely, if µ ≤ ymin, then D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3 ∩ D4d = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof proceeds in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. The
proposition is trivially true for the (counterfactually) poor population P(ω) as their norm
incomes are prescribed by (13). For each type T (ω) we can use (49) to rewrite yri for the
non-poor population and use this expression together with the FfP condition (13) in the
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EOp condition (9):
1
NT (ω)
 ∑
i∈P(ω)
ymin +
∑
i∈R(ω)
ymin + y
e
i
µe
µeT (ω)
Wi(σ)− ymin
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
Wj(σ)− ymin
(yrj − ymin)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrT (ω)
= µe. (51)
Solving for yrj we obtain:
yrj = ymin + (yej µ
e
µeT (ω)
Wj(σ)− ymin) (µ
e − ymin)
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
− ymin)
. (52)
As evidenced by (51), µrT (ω) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj
and we know that yrj ∈ (ymin,∞). Under the assumption that µe > ymin and invoking the
intermediate value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj for which (9) holds.
Since the choice of i, j ∈ R(ω) was arbitrary, expression (50) holds ∀ i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > ymin. Assume this was not true, i.e.
µe ≤ ymin. Then, it would still hold that µrT (ω) → ymin for yrj → ymin and µrT (ω) → ∞
for yrj → ∞. Hence, µrT (ω) ∈ (ymin,∞). However, from the EOp requirement (9) we
also know that µrT (ω) = µe. If µe ≤ ymin, either of these statements must be false and
hence D1∩D2∩D3∩D4d = ∅. Intuitively, if µe ≤ ymin one cannot lift all people above the
minimum threshold (D3), without drawing non-poor people below the minimum threshold
(D4d), while maintaining the equal resource requirement (D1). 
Note that σ can be interpreted as an inequality aversion parameter with respect to
excess income above ymin.1 To see this, note that ∂y
r
i
∂σ
> 0 (∂y
r
i
∂σ
< 0) if yei < µeR(ω)
(yei > µeR(ω)) and
∂2yri
∂σ∂yei
< 0. Hence, increasing σ leads to higher norm incomes for those
below the type-specific mean of excess income. The positive effect monotonically decreases
for increasing yei until it turns negative for incomes above the type-specific mean of excess
income.
Letting σ travel to one, Wi(σ)→ µeR(ω)/yei and the norm distribution collapses to the
1For the sake of illustration we treat σ as a uniform parameter for all ω ∈ Ω. However, it is easy to
allow for heterogeneity in σ across types.
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following expression:
lim
σ→1 y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
Wi(σ)− ymin) (µe−ymin)NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
(53)
=

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ymin + (µ
e−ymin)
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
(54)
=

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
µrR(ω), ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
(55)
Hence, increasing σ indicates increasing inequality aversion with respect to income dispar-
ities among the non-poor population of a particular type. With σ = 1, the norm income
of each non-poor type member is given by the average norm income of the non-poor con-
stituents of its respective type. As a consequence, average income differences between
the poor and the non-poor members of each type remain as the sole justifiable source
of inequality. Reversely, taking limits towards zero inequality aversion, Wi(σ) → 1, and
we obtain the baseline norm (see equation (15)) according to which excess norm incomes
above ymin are distributed proportionally to their empirical analogues.
A.5 Individual Minimum Thresholds
In our baseline analysis we account for differential needs across individuals by applying an
equivalence scale. Alternatively, one could also account for differential needs by replacing
the population-wide minimum threshold ymin with individual-specific minimum thresh-
olds yi,min. As a consequence, one would have to redefine the set of poor and non-poor
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individuals as follows:
P(ω) =
{
i ∈ N
∣∣∣∣ yei µeµeT (ω) ≤ yi,min
}
, ∀ ω ∈ Ω (56)
R(ω) =
{
i ∈ N
∣∣∣∣ yei µeµeT (ω) > yi,min
}
, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. (57)
Similarly, the FfP principle and the proportionality requirement would have to be rede-
fined in terms of the individual-specific minimum thresholds yi,min:
D3e =
{
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri = yi,min, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω} . (58)
D4e =
d ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ yri−yi,minyrj−yj,min =
yei
µe
µeT (ω)
−yi,min
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
−yj,min
, ∀ i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
 . (59)
In addition let us define the type-specific average of poverty thresholds µminT (ω) =
1
NT (ω)
∑
i∈T (ω) yi,min and the type-specific average of poverty thresholds among its non-poor
constituents µminR(ω) = 1NR(ω)
∑
i∈R(ω) yi,min.
These reformulations lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Suppose µe > µminT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Then, the intersection D1∩D2∩D3e∩D4e
yields a singleton which uniquely defines the norm distribution Y r:
yri =

yi,min, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
yi,min + (yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
− yi,min) (µ
e−µminT (ω))
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
−µminR(ω))
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
(60)
Conversely, if ∃ ω ∈ Ω: µe ≤ µminT (ω), then D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3e ∩ D4e = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof proceeds in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. The
proposition is trivially true for the (counterfactually) poor population P(ω) as their norm
incomes are prescribed by (58). For each type T (ω) we can use (59) to rewrite yri for the
non-poor population and use this expression together with the FfP condition (58) in the
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EOp condition (9):
1
NT (ω)
 ∑
i∈P(ω)
yi,min +
∑
i∈R(ω)
yi,min + y
e
i
µe
µeT (ω)
− yi,min
yej
µe
µeT (ω)
− yj,min
(yrj − yj,min)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µrT (ω)
= µe. (61)
Solving for yrj we obtain:
yrj = yj,min + (yej µ
e
µeT (ω)
− yj,min)
(µe − µminT (ω))
NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
− µminR(ω))
. (62)
As evidenced by (61), µrT (ω) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of yrj
and we know that yrj ∈ (yj,min,∞). Under the assumption that µe > µminT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
and invoking the intermediate value theorem, it follows that there is a unique value of yrj
for which (9) holds. Since the choice of i, j ∈ R(ω) was arbitrary, expression (60) holds
∀ i, j ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
However, such a unique value only exists if µe > µminT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Assume this was not
true, i.e. ∃ ω ∈ Ω: µe ≤ µminT (ω). Then, it would still hold that µrT (ω) → µminT (ω) for yrj → yj,min
and µrT (ω) → ∞ for yrj → ∞. Hence, µrT (ω) ∈
(
µminT (ω),∞
)
. However, from the EOp
requirement (9) we also know that µrT (ω) = µe. If µe ≤ µminT (ω), either of these statements
must be false and hence D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3e ∩ D4e = ∅. Intuitively, if ∃ ω ∈ Ω: µe ≤ µminT (ω)
one cannot lift all people above the minimum threshold (D3e), without drawing non-
poor people below the minimum threshold (D4e), while maintaining the equal resource
requirement (D1). 
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B COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this appendix we give a comprehensive overview over the comparative statics of all
norms listed in Table 1. A general overview can be found in Table S.1. Each of the
illustrated comparative static scenarios is discussed verbally in the following.
(a) EOp or FfP Only
(1) Assume ymin → 0. The limit case with ymin = 0 is equivalent to abstracting from the
concern for FfP altogether.
• Baseline: Leads to P(ω) = ∅, µeR(ω) = µeT (ω), NR(ω) = NT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a
consequence, realizing weak EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (a): Leads to P(θ) = ∅, µeR(θ) = µe, NR(θ) = N, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. As a
consequence, realizing strong EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (b): Leads to P = ∅, NR = N , and µeT (ω)∩R = µeT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a
consequence, realizing weak EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (c): Leads to P = ∅, NR = N , and µeS(θ)∩R = µeS(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. As a
consequence, realizing strong EOp remains the only normative concern.
(2) Assume T → 1. The limit case with T = 1 is equivalent to abstracting from the
concern for EOp altogether. It also leads to P(ω) = P = P(θ).
• Baseline: Leads to NR(ω) = NR, NT (ω) = N , µeR(ω) = µeR, µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As
a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess income
above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (a): Leads to NR(Θ) = NR, µeR(Θ) = µeR, µeS(θ) = yei , ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈
Θ. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess
income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
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• Alternative (b): Leads to µeT (ω)∩R = µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a consequence, poverty
eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess income above ymin remains the
only normative concern.
• Alternative (c): Leads to µeS(θ)∩R = yei , ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. As a conse-
quence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess income above
ymin remains the only normative concern.
(b) Freedom from Poverty
(3) Assume NP(ω) → 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω. The limit case with NP(ω) = 0 is equivalent to zero
poverty incidence if resources were distributed in accordance with weak EOp.
• Baseline: Leads to P(ω) = ∅, µeR(ω) = µeT (ω), NR(ω) = NT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a
consequence, realizing weak EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (a): ∪kP(ω) = ∅ implies ∪lP(θ) = ∅. Hence, µeR(Θ) = µe, and
NR(Θ) = N . As a consequence, realizing strong EOp remains the only normative
concern.
• Alternative (b): No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income
of ymin based on P . Since ∪kP(ω) = ∅ does not imply P = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (c): No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income
of ymin based on P . Since ∪kP(ω) = ∅ does not imply P = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case
(4) Assume NP → 0. The limit case with NP = 0 is equivalent to zero poverty incidence
in the empirical income distribution.
• Baseline: No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income of ymin
based on P(ω). Since P = ∅ does not imply ∪kP(ω) = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
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• Alternative (a): P = ∅ implies ∪lP(θ) = ∅. Hence, µeR(Θ) = µe, and NR(Θ) = N .
As a consequence, realizing strong EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (b): Leads to NR = N , and µeT (ω)∩R = µeT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a
consequence, realizing weak EOp through a type-specific linear transfer rate on
excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (c): Leads to NR = N , and µeR = µe, µeS(ω)∩R = µeS(ω), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. As a
consequence, realizing strong EOp remains the only normative concern.
(5) Assume NP(θ) → 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. The limit case with NP(θ) = 0 is equivalent to zero
poverty incidence if resources were distributed in accordance with strong EOp.
• Baseline: No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income of ymin
based on P(ω). Since ∪lP(θ) = ∅ does not imply ∪kP(ω) = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (a): Leads to µeR(Θ) = µe, NR(Θ) = N . As a consequence, realizing
strong EOp remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (b): No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income
of ymin based on P . Since ∪lP(θ) = ∅ does not imply P = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (c): No difference. The poor are identified and tied to a norm income
of ymin based on P . Since ∪lP(θ) = ∅ does not imply P = ∅ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
(c) Equality of Opportunity
(6) Assume µeT (ω) → µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. The limit case with µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω corresponds
to a society in which weak EOp is realized. It also leads to ∪kP(ω) = P .
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• Baseline: Weak EOp under the non-separability assumption is realized by assump-
tion. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a type-specific linear transfer
rate on excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (a): No difference. Strong EOp under the non-separability assumption
requires equalizing all moments of the type distribution. Since µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω
does not imply yei = yej = µeS(θ), ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ the calculation of the norm
remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (b): No difference. Weak EOp under the separability assumption
requires equalizing type mean incomes above ymin only. Since µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈
Ω does not imply µrT (ω)∩R = µrR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω the calculation of the norm remains
unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (c): No difference. Strong EOp under the separability assumption
requires equalizing all incomes of the non-poor tranche members. Since µeT (ω) =
µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω does not imply yei = yej = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ the
calculation of the norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
(7) Assume yei → µeS(θ), ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ . The limit case with yei = µeS(θ), ∀ i ∈
S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ corresponds to a society in which strong EOp is realized. It also leads to
∪kP(ω) = P = ∪lP(θ).
• Baseline: Weak EOp under the non-separability assumption requires equalizing
type mean incomes. yei = µeS(θ), ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ implies µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As
a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess income
above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (a): Strong EOp under the non-separability assumption is realized by
assumption. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate
on excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
15
• Alternative (b): Weak EOp under the separability assumption requires equalizing
type mean incomes above ymin only. yei = yej = µeS(θ), ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ implies
µeT (ω)∩R = µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear
transfer rate on excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (c): Strong EOp under the separability assumption requires equalizing
all incomes of the non-poor tranche members. yei = yej = µeS(θ), ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈
Θ implies yei = yej = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ)∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. As a consequence, poverty
eradication through a linear transfer rate on excess income above ymin remains the
only normative concern.
(8) Assume µeT (ω)∩R → µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω. The limit case corresponds to a society in which
weak EOp is realized under the separability assumption.
• Baseline: No difference. Weak EOp under the non-separability assumption requires
equalizing type mean incomes. Since µeT (ω)∩R = µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω does not imply
µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω the calculation of the norm remains unaffected even in the
limit case.
• Alternative (a): No difference. Strong EOp under the non-separability assumption
requires equalizing all moments of the type distribution. Since µeT (ω)∩R = µeR, ∀ ω ∈
Ω does not imply yei = yej = µeS(θ), ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (b): Weak EOp under the separability assumption is realized by
assumption. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate
on excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
• Alternative (c): No difference. Strong EOp under the separability assumption
requires equalizing all incomes of the non-poor tranche members. Since µeT (ω)∩R =
µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω does not imply yei = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ the calculation
of the norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
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(9) Assume yei → µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. The limit case corresponds to a
society in which strong EOp is realized under the separability assumption.
• Baseline: No difference. Weak EOp under the non-separability assumption requires
equalizing type mean incomes. Since yei = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ does
not imply µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω the calculation of the norm remains unaffected even
in the limit case.
• Alternative (a): No difference. Strong EOp under the non-separability assumption
requires equalizing all moments of the type distribution. Since yei = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈
S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ does not imply yei = yej = µeS(θ), ∀ i, j ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ the
calculation of the norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (b): No difference. Weak EOp under the separability assumption
requires equalizing type mean incomes above ymin only. Since yei = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈
S(θ) ∩ R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ does not imply µrT (ω)∩R = µrR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω the calculation of the
norm remains unaffected even in the limit case.
• Alternative (c): Strong EOp under the separability assumption is realized by
assumption. As a consequence, poverty eradication through a linear transfer rate
on excess income above ymin remains the only normative concern.
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Table S.1 – Overview Comparative Statics
Baseline Alternative (a) Alternative (b) Alternative (c)
Norm Distribution Y r
yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
ymin + (yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
− ymin) (µe−ymin)NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)
µe
µeT (ω)
−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
ymin + (µeS(θ) − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR(Θ)
N
(µeR(Θ)−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ R(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩ P , ∀ ω ∈ Ω
ymin + (yei − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeT (ω)∩R−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω) ∩R, ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩ P , ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
ymin + (µeS(i)∩R − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ
(a) EOp or FfP Only
(1) ymin = 0 yri = yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ yri = yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
(2) T = 1 yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R
(b) Freedom from Poverty
(3) P(ω) = 0, ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri = yei µ
e
µeT (ω)
, ∀ i ∈ T (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ No difference No difference
(4) P = 0 No difference yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ yri = ymin + (yei − ymin) (µ
e−ymin)
(µeT (ω)−ymin)
, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ
(5) P(θ) = 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ No difference yri = yei
µeS(θ)
yei
, ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ No difference No difference
(c) Equality of Opportunity
(6) µeT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω
ymin + (yei − ymin)
1− NP(ω)NT (ω) (ymin−µeP(ω))NR(ω)
NT (ω)
(µeR(ω)−ymin)
 , ∀ i ∈ R(ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω No difference No difference No difference
(7) yei = µeS(θ), ∀ i ∈ S(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R y
r
i =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R
(8) µeT (ω)∩R = µeR, ∀ ω ∈ Ω No difference No difference yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R No difference
(9) yei = µeS(θ)∩R, ∀ i ∈ S(θ) ∩R, ∀ θ ∈ Θ No difference No difference No difference yri =

ymin, ∀ i ∈ P
ymin + (yei − ymin)
(
1−
NP
N
(ymin−µeP )
NR
N
(µeR−ymin)
)
, ∀ i ∈ R
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C DATA APPENDIX
C.1 Disposable Household Income
PSID. We construct disposable household income as the sum of household labor income,
household asset income, household private transfers, household private pensions, other
household income, household public pensions, household public cash assistance minus
total household taxes. These income aggregates are calculated and provided by PSID
CNEF.
In view of changes in the handling of negative incomes across waves, we consistently
set household asset income and household private transfers to zero if they are negative or
missing.
We account for the under-reporting of government transfer income by scaling up house-
hold public cash assistance of each recipient household in year t by the inverse of the
following adjustment factor:
URt = Vpt∑
p
Vpt
∗ URPSIDpt , (63)
where URPSIDpt is the share of transfer income from government program p in year t
reported by PSID households when comparing their cumulated reports to government
statistics on annual spending in the respective program. Vpt indicates the total volume
of government spending on program p in year t. URPSIDpt and Vpt are taken from the
time series provided in Meyer et al. (2015). The government programs p include Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI), Workers’ Compensation (WC), Social Security Retirement and
Survivors Insurance (OASI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), the Food Stamp Program (SNAP), and Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF). Since their
time series end in 2010 we fit URPSIDpt to a second-order polynomial of the year-variable
and impute URPSIDpt for 2012 and 2014 with the predicted values. The time series for
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URPSIDt is displayed in Figure S.1.
Figure S.1 – Correction Factor for Under-reporting of Transfer Income (US),
1969-2014
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Data: Meyer et al. (2015).
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the correction factor for under-reported transfer incomes in the PSID over the time period
1969-2014. The correction factor is calculated based on equation (63) and the time series presented in Meyer et al. (2015). The solid lines
display Lowess smoothed time trends where each data point is constructed using 80% of all data points (Bandwidth 0.8).
We account for the under-reporting of labor income by imputing individual labor
incomes according to the following procedure. First, we identify individuals with zero
or missing labor income information but non-zero working hours. Second we run the
following Mincer regression on the pooled PSID sample:2
ln yict = β0 + β1Hoursict + β2Hours2ict + β3Ageict + β4Age2ict
+ β5Raceict + β6Maleict + β7Educationict + γt + ict.
(64)
Third, we impute individual labor incomes of the identified individuals with the income
predictions from the Mincer regression. Fourth, we aggregate the volume of imputed
incomes across all members of a household and add the imputed incomes to the household
labor income provided by PSID CNEF.
2The underlying variables are constructed according to the details provided in this Data Appendix.
Regression results are available upon request.
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The resulting variable for disposable household income is converted to equivalized
disposable household income using the modified OECD equivalence scale, winsorized at
the 1st and 99.5th percentiles, and converted into PPP-adjusted US Dollar using the
conversion factors provided by the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015).
EU-SILC. We construct household disposable income as the sum of household labor
income, household asset income, household private transfers, household private pensions,
other household income, household public pensions, household public cash assistance mi-
nus total household taxes.
For consistency with the PSID, we set household asset income and household private
transfers to zero if they are negative or missing. We account for the under-reporting of
government transfer income by scaling up household public cash assistance of each re-
cipient household in country c by the inverse of the adjustment factor URSILCc . URSILCc
is extracted from EUROSTAT (2013) – a report in which EUROSTAT compares vari-
ous income sources from EU-SILC with the corresponding national accounts aggregates.
Specifically, URSILCc contains family/children-related allowances, unemployment bene-
fits, old-age benefits, survivors’ benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, education-
related allowances, and social exclusion benefits not elsewhere classified. This exercise is
conducted for the income reference period 2008 and we write the calculated values for-
ward to 2010. Furthermore, five of our sample countries were excluded from the analysis
due to a lack of information from either of the two data sources (Bulgaria, Malta, Ro-
mania, Iceland and Croatia). For these countries we impute URSILCc with the European
cross-country sample mean. The values for URSILCc are displayed in Figure S.2.
We account for the under-reporting of labor income by imputing individual labor
incomes in the same way as in the PSID. To this end we construct a EU-SILC country-
panel spanning the time period 2006-2014. In contrast to the PSID we run the underlying
Mincer regression separately for each country in the EU-SILC sample and replace the race
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Figure S.2 – Correction Factor for Under-reporting of Transfer Income
(Cross-Country Sample), 2010
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Data: EUROSTAT (2013) and Meyer et al. (2015).
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the correction factor for under-reported transfer incomes in the the cross-country sample in 2010.
The correction factor is calculated based on equation (63) and the time series presented in Meyer et al. (2015) as well as the under-reporting
factors reported in EUROSTAT (2013). Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points
to the right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions.
indicator with the migration background indicator:3
ln yict = β0 + β1Hoursict + β2Hours2ict + β3Ageict + β4Age2ict
+ β5Mig. Backgroundict + β6Maleict + β7Educationict + γt + ict.
(65)
Again, the resulting variable for disposable household income is converted to equival-
ized disposable household income using the modified OECD equivalence scale, winsorized
at the 1st and 99.5th percentiles, and converted into PPP-adjusted US Dollar using the
conversion factors provided by the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015).
C.2 Biological Sex
PSID. We use the binary biological sex variable provided by PSID CNEF. Using the
panel dimension of the PSID we replace the few missing values with the mode of all
records for the respective individual.
3The underlying variables are constructed according to the details provided in this Data Appendix.
Regression results are available upon request.
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EU-SILC. We use the binary biological sex variable provided by EU-SILC. Respondents
with missing information are dropped through list-wise deletion.
C.3 Race/Migration Background
PSID. We use the 6-category race indicator (White, Black, Am. Indian-Inuit, Asian-
Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, Other) provided by PSID CNEF and transform it into
a binary indicator for non-Hispanic whites and others. Using the panel dimension of the
PSID we replace missing values with the mode of all records for the respective individual.
EU-SILC. We use the 3-category migration background indicator (born in country of
residence, born in other European country, born elsewhere) provided by EU-SILC and
transform it into a binary indicator for whether the respondent was born in her current
country of residence or not. Respondents with missing information are dropped through
list-wise deletion.
C.4 Parental Education
PSID. We use the 9-category indicator for paternal and maternal education provided
by the PSID and transform them into a 3-category indicator for high, medium, and low
education according to the classification scheme outlined in Table S.2. We retain the high-
est information of either parent. We replace missing information by the highest recorded
education level from previous years. Since educational attainment cannot be downgraded
we also replace lower educational attainments by the highest recorded education level
from previous years.
EU-SILC. We use the 5-category indicator for paternal and maternal education pro-
vided by EU-SILC and transform them into a 3-category indicator for high, medium,
and low education according to the classification scheme outlined in Table S.2. We then
retain the highest information of either parent. Respondents with missing information
are dropped through list-wise deletion.
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Table S.2 – Harmonization of Education Codes
PSID EU-SILC
High (1) College BA and no advanced degree mentioned (1) At least first stage of tertiary education
(2) College and advanced or professional degree (2) –
(3) College but no degree (3) –
Middle (4) 12 grades (4) Upper secondary education
(5) 12 grades plus non-academic training (5) –
Low (6) 0-5 grades (6) Pre-primary, primary education, lower secondary education
(7) 6-8 grades (7) Father (mother) could neither read nor write
(8) 9-11 grades (8) Don’t know
(9) Could not read or write (9) –
C.5 Parental Occupation
PSID. In the PSID, waves 1970-2001 report occupation codes with reference to 1970
census codes. Waves 2003-2015 report occupation codes with reference to 2000 census
codes. If available on 3-digit level, we use the cross-walk routine provided by Autor and
Dorn (2013) to standardize codes based on the 1990 census classification. 1 (28) of the
1970 (2000) 3-digit occupational codes available in the PSID are not included in the cross-
walks provided by Autor and Dorn (2013). These categories are matched to their 1990
census classification analogues by the authors of this paper. This classification is available
on request. We then aggregate all codes to the 1-digit level and apply the classification
scheme outlined in Table S.3.
Additionally, wives of household heads report parental occupation codes in terms of
1970 codes at the 2-digit level in the 1976 wave. We aggregate them to the 1-digit level
and apply the classification scheme outlined in Table S.3. Using the panel dimension
of the PSID we replace missing values with the mode of all records for the respective
individual.
EU-SILC. In EU-SILC, the 2011 wave reports occupation codes with reference to the
ISCO-08 classification. We aggregate all codes to the 1-digit level and apply the classifi-
cation scheme outlined in Table S.3. Respondents with missing information are dropped
through list-wise deletion.
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Table S.3 – Harmonization of Occupation Codes
Census 1970 Census 1990 ISCO-08
High (1) Professional, Technical andKindred workers
(1) Managerial and
Professional Specialty Occ. (1) Managers
(2) Managers, Officials and Proprietors (2) Technical and Sales Op. (2) Professionals
(3) Self-Employed Businessmen – (3) Technicians andAssociate Professionals
Middle (4) Clerical and Sales Workers (3) Administrative Support Occ.,Including Clerical (4) Clerical Support Workers
(5) Craftsmen, Foremen and
Kindred Workers
(5) Precision Production, Craft,
and Repair Occ. (5) Service and Sales workers
(6) Operatives and Kindred Workers (7) Machine Op., Assemblers,and Inspectors (7) Craft and Related Trade Workers
– (6) Extractive and PrecisionProduction Occ.
(8) Plant and Machine Op.s and
Assemblers
Low (7) Laborers, Service Workers andFarm Laborers
(4) Service, Farming, Forestry,
and Fishing Occ.
(6) Skilled Agric., Forestry and
Fishery Workers
(8) Farmers and Farm Managers
(8) Transportation and
Material Moving Occ.,
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners,
Helpers, and Laborers
(9) Elementary Occ.
(9) Miscellaneous (incl. Armed Services,
Protective Workers etc.) (9) Military Occ. (0) Armed Forces Occ.
(-) Not in Labor Force (-) Not in Labor Force (-) Not in Labor Force
C.6 Other Circumstances
PSID. For the robustness checks presented in section 5 we construct two additional
circumstance variables. First, the PSID collects the census region of upbringing for all
individuals. Furthermore, we transform the resulting 4-category variable into three binary
indicators. Second, the PSID reports the state of upbringing of both mother and father
of individual respondents. We transform this variable into a binary variable indicating
whether either the mother or the father had been raised in a foreign country. Using the
panel dimension of the PSID we replace missing values in both variables with the mode
of all records for the respective individual.
EU-SILC. For the robustness checks presented in section 5 we construct four addi-
tional circumstance variables. First, EU-SILC provides a 5-category variable indicating
whether respondents at the age of 14 lived with i) both parents (or persons considered
as parents), ii) father only (or person considered as a father), iii) mother only (or person
considered as a mother), iv) in a private household without any parent, or v) in a collec-
tive household or institution. We transform this variable into a binary variable indicating
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whether individuals lived with both parents at the age of 14. Second, EU-SILC provides
a categorical variable indicating the number of children in the household in which they
lived at age 14. We transform this variable into a binary variable indicating whether in-
dividuals lived with less than 3 siblings at age 14. Third, EU-SILC provides a 6-category
variable indicating whether the financial situation of the household in which respondents
lived at the age of 14 was i) very bad, ii) bad, iii) moderately bad, iv) moderately good,
v) good or vi) very good. We transform this variable into a binary variable indicating
whether individuals lived in a household in which the situation was at least moderately
good. Fourth, EU-SILC provides a 3-category variable indicating whether respondents
at the age of 14 lived in i) owner-occupied housing, ii) as tenants or iii) in a household
to which accommodation was provided for free. We transform this variable into a binary
variable indicating whether individuals lived in owner-occupied housing. Respondents
with missing information in any of these variables are dropped through list-wise deletion.
C.7 Individual Working Hours
PSID. PSID CNEF reports the total annual working hours of individuals. We replace
missing hours information with zero if the respondent reports to be unemployed. In each
year, we winsorize the resulting distribution from above at the 99th percentile.
EU-SILC. EU-SILC reports weekly working hours of individuals in their main and side
jobs. We set hours to zero if the respondent reports to be unemployed, retired or otherwise
inactive in the labor market. We add hours in the main and the side jobs to obtain total
weekly working hours and multiply by 52 to obtain total annual working hours. In each
year, we winsorize the resulting distribution from above at the 99th percentile.
C.8 Individual Education
PSID. PSID CNEF reports individual educational attainment by total years of edu-
cation. We map years of education into a 5-point categorical variable that corresponds
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to the ISCED-11 classification: (Pre-)Primary (1-6 years), Lower Secondary (7-11 years),
Upper Secondary (12 years), Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary (13-14 years), Tertiary (>14
years). We replace missing information by the highest recorded education level from pre-
vious years. Since educational attainment cannot be downgraded we also replace lower
educational attainments by the highest recorded education level from previous years.
EU-SILC. EU-SILC reports individual educational attainment in terms of the ISCED-
11 classification. In view of small cell sizes we reduce the scale from 7 categories to 5
categories by merging Pre-Primary and Primary Education and First Stage Tertiary and
Second Stage Tertiary Education. This merger corresponds to the 5-point categorical
variable that we have coded for the PSID. Respondents with missing information are
dropped through list-wise deletion.
C.9 Transformation to Type-Tranche Cells
In each country-year cell of our data we partition the population into a maximum of
36 circumstance types. These types are divided into 20 quantiles ordered by increasing
incomes that identify Roemerian effort tranches. Since we use population weights, indi-
vidual observations with high weights may span more than one effort tranche. To assure
the existence of all effort tranches in every type, we duplicate the respective individual ob-
servations and divide their weight by two. We repeat this procedure until all type-effort
cells are populated. We then collapse the data to the type-tranche level by replacing
individual incomes and effort variables (individual education, individual working hours)
by their respective cell average. Hence, each country-year cell of our data contains a
maximum of 36 x 20 observations. In Figure S.3 we plot summary statistics of the raw
distribution of our outcome variable against the same statistics calculated on the collapsed
data. These statistics include the mean, the Gini coefficient, the mean log deviation, the
poverty headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio, as well as the Watts index. Results are
presented separately for the US sample over time and the cross-country comparison sam-
ple. The closer the data points align to the 45 degree line, the smaller the information
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loss from collapsing the raw data to the type-tranche level.
Figure S.3 – Raw Data vs. Type x Tranche-Cells
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure plots standard measures of inequality and poverty estimated on the raw data against the corresponding
estimates on data that is collapsed to type-tranche cells. The maroon line displays the 45 degree line. If inequality and poverty estimates on
the raw data and the collapsed data were perfectly identical, all data points would align on the 45 degree line.
C.10 Poverty Lines
The PPP-adjusted US Dollar values of all poverty lines are displayed in Figure S.4.
Baseline. Jolliffe and Prydz (2016) provide national poverty lines and average con-
sumption expenditures per capita in PPP-adjusted US Dollar per day for a sample of
126 countries. With the exception of Malta and Cyprus all countries of our sample are
covered in their data base. Based on average per capita consumption expenditures we
divide the data sample into quintiles. We assign the median poverty line of each consump-
tion expenditure quintile to the respective countries. The resulting five poverty lines are
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Figure S.4 – Alternative Poverty Lines
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Data: PSID, EU-SILC, EUROSTAT, US Census Bureau, and Allen (2017).
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the value of alternative poverty thresholds ymin for each country-year cell in our data samples.
The upper panel refers to the longitudinal US sample. The lower panel refers to the cross-country sample. All poverty lines are expressed in
PPP-adjusted US Dollar (USD). Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to the
right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions.
multiplied by 365 to obtain national poverty lines in terms of PPP-adjusted US Dollar
per capita and year. Following the suggestion of van den Boom et al. (2015) we divide
each poverty line by 0.7 to convert the poverty lines from per capita into adult-equivalent
terms. In view of their high-income status we assign Malta and Cyprus the same poverty
line as the countries from the highest consumption expenditure quintile.
National Poverty Line. For the US we retrieve the time series of the official poverty
line for unrelated individuals under the age of 65 from the US Census Bureau and convert
it into PPP-adjusted US Dollar using the conversion factors provided by the Penn World
Tables (Feenstra et al. 2015). Similarly, we retrieve the official poverty lines for all Euro-
pean countries in 2010 from EUROSTAT. The poverty lines are provided in PPP-adjusted
units already, requiring no further adjustment.
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Basic Needs Poverty (BNP) Line. Allen (2017) provides basic needs adjusted poverty
lines in PPP-adjusted US Dollar per day for four countries in our sample: Lithuania
($4.62), United Kingdom ($3.49), United States ($3.72) and France ($4.02). Taking the
unweighted average across these poverty lines yields a value of $3.96 which we multiply
by 365 to obtain the annual BNP line. We apply this BNP line to all countries and years
in our sample.
At-Risk-of-Poverty (AROP) Line. In each country-year cell we calculate the median
of the distribution of disposable household income (see above). The AROP line is then
drawn at 60% of the respective country-year-specific median.
OECD Poverty Line. The OECD poverty line is calculated as the AROP line. How-
ever, the OECD line is drawn at 50% of the respective country-year-specific median.
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Figure S.5 – Normative Preferences
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Data: European Social Survey (2018).
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the average support for four different principles of justice in 18 of our sample countries. Answers
are given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Agree Strongly) to 5 (Disagree Strongly). We invert the scale such that higher values
indicate stronger support. The questions for the different dimensions are based on Hu¨lle et al. (2018) and read as as follows. i) Perfect
Equality: A society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people. ii) Effort: A society is fair when hard-working
people earn more than others. iii) Need: A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of what they give
back to society. iv) Entitlement: A society is fair when people from families with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives.
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Figure S.6 – Decomposition by Principle (US), 1969-2014
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the contribution of EOp and FfP to total inequality in the US over the period 1969-2014.
(Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which
corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The
decomposition is based on the Shapley value procedure proposed in Shorrocks (2012). The solid lines display Lowess smoothed time trends
where each data point is constructed using 80% of all data points (Bandwidth 0.8).
Figure S.7 – Poverty in the US, 1969-2014
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of poverty in the US over the period 1969-2014 according to different poverty
measures. Poverty statistics are displayed in units of the poverty headcount ratio (in %): All data points are rescaled by multiplying with the
cross-year mean of the poverty headcount ratio and dividing by the cross-year mean of the respective poverty measure. The solid lines display
Lowess smoothed time trends where each data point is constructed using 80% of all data points (Bandwidth 0.8).
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Figure S.8 – Income Gaps and Population Shares of Single Households in the
US, 1969-2014
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Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the share of females (males) living in households with only one adult present (in %) and the
female-male income gap among those households. The female-male income gap is calculated as
(
1− µft
µmt
)
∗ 100 where µft (µmt) is the
average disposable household income of females (males) living in households with only one adult present in year t. The solid lines display
Lowess smoothed time trends where each data point is constructed using 80% of all data points (Bandwidth 0.8).
Figure S.9 – (Non-)White Income Gaps and Population Shares in the US,
1969-2014
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Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the share of individuals classified as non-white/Hispanic (in %) and the average income gap in
comparison to individuals classified as white/non-Hispanic. The income gap is calculated as
(
1− µnt
µwt
)
∗ 100 where µnt (µwt) is the average
disposable household income of the non-white/Hispanic (white/non-Hispanic) population in year t. The solid lines display Lowess smoothed
time trends where each data point is constructed using 80% of all data points (Bandwidth 0.8).
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Figure S.10 – Social Mobility in the US, 1969-2014
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Note: Own calculations. This figure displays estimates of unfair inequality considering parental education and parental occupation as the only
relevant circumstance characteristics while abstracting from the concern for FfP. The calculation is conducted for each age bin-year-cell and
then aggregated to the indicated year bins by taking unweighted averages. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure
proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality.
Figure S.11 – Poverty, 2006-2014
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Note: Own calculations. This figure displays the development of FfP as measured by the difference between the Watts index and the poverty
gap ratio over the period 2006-2014. The selected countries represent the six most unfair societies of our cross-country sample in 2010. The
vertical dashed line marks the starting year of the global financial crisis.
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Table S.4 – Descriptive Statistics US, 1969-2014
Income Circumstances Efforts Poverty
Male Race Educ. Occ. Hours Educ.
1969 24,636 0.53 0.88 1.37 1.73 1,575 2.98 0.18
1970 25,254 0.53 0.87 1.39 1.74 1,551 3.01 0.17
1971 25,718 0.52 0.86 1.40 1.75 1,537 3.03 0.16
1972 26,597 0.52 0.86 1.42 1.75 1,557 3.06 0.15
1973 27,110 0.48 0.85 1.61 1.77 1,519 3.10 0.12
1974 26,689 0.48 0.85 1.64 1.78 1,485 3.26 0.14
1975 26,342 0.48 0.86 1.70 1.79 1,459 3.30 0.13
1976 27,392 0.48 0.86 1.72 1.80 1,478 3.33 0.13
1977 27,093 0.48 0.85 1.74 1.81 1,507 3.36 0.12
1978 27,481 0.48 0.85 1.75 1.82 1,548 3.37 0.11
1979 27,105 0.48 0.85 1.77 1.83 1,552 3.39 0.12
1980 26,668 0.48 0.85 1.78 1.83 1,553 3.41 0.13
1981 25,934 0.48 0.84 1.81 1.85 1,553 3.43 0.14
1982 26,854 0.48 0.84 1.83 1.86 1,531 3.45 0.16
1983 27,968 0.48 0.84 1.85 1.87 1,551 3.47 0.15
1984 28,854 0.48 0.84 1.90 1.89 1,642 3.62 0.14
1985 29,413 0.48 0.83 1.92 1.91 1,647 3.65 0.13
1986 29,704 0.47 0.83 1.94 1.92 1,647 3.66 0.14
1987 31,644 0.48 0.83 1.96 1.93 1,669 3.68 0.12
1988 33,380 0.48 0.83 1.99 1.94 1,689 3.70 0.12
1989 33,061 0.48 0.83 2.00 1.95 1,704 3.71 0.12
1990 34,134 0.48 0.82 2.02 1.96 1,719 3.72 0.11
1991 33,301 0.48 0.82 2.03 1.97 1,693 3.73 0.12
1992 34,607 0.48 0.82 2.06 1.98 1,662 3.74 0.11
1993 34,567 0.48 0.82 2.08 2.00 1,671 3.75 0.12
1994 34,478 0.49 0.81 2.10 2.02 1,699 3.73 0.12
1995 36,012 0.49 0.81 2.12 2.03 1,748 3.75 0.09
1996 38,791 0.49 0.83 2.25 2.09 1,780 3.80 0.08
1998 39,776 0.49 0.81 2.21 2.11 1,808 3.76 0.11
2000 41,579 0.49 0.80 2.23 2.13 1,791 3.75 0.09
2002 41,104 0.49 0.79 2.23 2.15 1,755 3.75 0.09
2004 42,586 0.49 0.79 2.22 2.14 1,750 3.82 0.10
2006 44,061 0.48 0.78 2.23 2.16 1,735 3.83 0.11
2008 43,496 0.48 0.78 2.24 2.17 1,681 3.86 0.10
2010 41,268 0.48 0.76 2.25 2.19 1,606 4.00 0.11
2012 41,874 0.48 0.75 2.27 2.21 1,659 4.03 0.10
2014 42,675 0.48 0.74 2.29 2.22 1,703 4.05 0.10
Data: PSID.
Note: Own calculations. This table displays descriptive statistics for the longitudinal US sample. Male displays the share of males. Race
displays the share of white/non-Hispanics. The circumstance variables Educ. (Occ.) show the average education (occupation) level of the
parent with the highest education (occupation) status measured on a 3-point scale. Hours show the average working hours per year. The
effort variable Educ. shows the average education level measured on a 6-point scale. Poverty shows the share of people below the baseline
poverty line. Further detail on the construction of all variables is disclosed in Supplementary Material C.
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Table S.5 – Descriptive Statistics Cross-Country Sample, 2010
Income Circumstances Efforts Poverty
Male
Mig./
Race Educ. Occ. Hours Educ.
AT 35,829 0.50 0.79 1.80 1.94 1,599 3.37 0.03
BE 31,917 0.50 0.84 1.79 2.29 1,574 3.65 0.03
BG 9,295 0.50 1.00 1.70 1.94 1,631 3.27 0.12
CH 42,784 0.49 0.69 1.89 2.27 1,710 3.60 0.02
CY 33,336 0.48 0.78 1.49 1.92 1,671 3.38 0.04
CZ 17,836 0.44 0.96 1.56 2.24 1,695 3.32 0.00
DE 30,311 0.50 0.87 2.05 2.22 1,597 3.50 0.08
DK 33,699 0.52 0.94 2.04 2.31 1,623 3.66 0.04
EE 14,526 0.48 0.87 2.03 2.30 1,596 3.69 0.05
EL 19,526 0.50 0.89 1.38 1.81 1,311 3.26 0.32
ES 25,679 0.51 0.84 1.32 1.92 1,392 3.13 0.17
FI 30,887 0.52 0.97 1.85 1.85 1,549 3.76 0.05
FR 31,520 0.49 0.90 1.40 2.01 1,616 3.40 0.05
HR 12,952 0.50 0.89 1.61 1.95 1,299 3.15 0.05
HU 12,098 0.48 0.99 1.55 2.00 1,425 3.30 0.02
IE 29,921 0.42 0.79 1.74 1.97 1,167 3.70 0.08
IS 27,941 0.51 0.89 1.90 2.26 1,828 3.53 0.05
IT 26,813 0.50 0.88 1.32 1.99 1,435 2.91 0.16
LT 11,848 0.48 0.94 1.66 1.94 1,528 3.83 0.08
LU 43,214 0.50 0.49 1.66 2.18 1,595 3.07 0.02
LV 11,545 0.47 0.88 1.83 2.14 1,480 3.51 0.11
MT 23,952 0.50 0.95 1.37 1.99 1,420 2.68 0.15
NL 32,002 0.50 0.88 1.91 2.34 1,450 3.61 0.03
NO 37,728 0.54 0.93 2.15 2.38 1,718 3.62 0.02
PL 17,200 0.47 1.00 1.70 1.90 1,622 3.35 0.02
PT 20,140 0.48 0.91 1.15 1.93 1,574 2.31 0.30
RO 7,264 0.50 1.00 1.25 1.57 1,602 3.22 0.21
SE 29,750 0.55 0.91 1.99 1.00 1,526 3.73 0.06
SI 20,999 0.51 0.88 1.54 2.05 1,598 3.37 0.17
SK 15,795 0.49 0.99 1.78 2.13 1,667 3.42 0.02
UK 29,198 0.47 0.87 1.71 2.34 1,596 3.81 0.08
US 41,268 0.48 0.76 2.25 2.19 1,606 4.00 0.11
US (Non-South) 42,268 0.48 0.80 2.28 2.20 1,615 4.00 0.10
US (South) 39,261 0.48 0.68 2.21 2.16 1,589 4.00 0.14
Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This table displays descriptive statistics for the cross-country sample. Male displays the share of males. Mig./Race
displays the share of people born in their current country of residence (white/non-Hispanics) in the European (US) sample. The circumstance
variables Educ. (Occ.) show the average education (occupation) level of the parent with the highest education (occupation) status measured
on a 3-point scale. Hours show the average working hours per year. The effort variable Educ. shows the average education level measured
on a 6-point scale. Poverty shows the share of people below the baseline poverty line. Further detail on the construction of all variables is
disclosed in Supplementary Material C.
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F DECORRELATING Ω AND Θ
First, we regress the outcome of interest (yei ) on a vector of type fixed effects (δT (ω)), a
categorical variable for educational attainment (educi) and annual working hours (hoursi):
yei = δT (ω) + β1hoursi + β2educi + i. (66)
Second, we construct a counterfactual distribution Y˜ e by adding residuals to the estimated
type averages net of their correlation with the considered effort variables:
y˜ei = δˆT (ω) + ˆi. (67)
Third, we use Y˜ e as an input to the construction of the reference distribution Y r (see
equation 15) and repeat our analysis according to the usual steps.
To develop an intuition for this procedure consider the polar case in which circum-
stances influenced outcomes only indirectly through their impact on education and work-
ing hours. Then δˆT (ω) = µe, ∀ ω ∈ Ω and our measure of unfairness collapses to the
case in which we abstracted from the concern for EOp altogether (see equations (21) and
(22)). This is precisely what the normative stance of Barry (2005) requires.
Reversely, consider the polar case in which there is zero correlation between circum-
stances on the one hand, and education and working hours on the other hand. In this case
circumstances influence outcomes only directly without affecting intermediate outcomes
that are partially under the control of individuals. Then δˆT (ω) = µeT (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω, and we
would recover exactly our baseline measure of unfair inequality (see equations (15) and
(16)).4
4Another way to think about this procedure is that the alternative normative stance of Barry (2005)
does not require perfect equalization of type means tout court, but perfect equalization of type means
once they are cleaned from effort influence.
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G SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS CROSS-COUNTRY
COMPARISON
Figure S.12 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
Alternative Norm Distributions
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays cross-country differences in (unfair) inequality in 2010 according to the alternative norm
distributions outlined in Table 1. Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to
the right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure
proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of
unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of
total inequality depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
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Figure S.13 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
Alternative Circumstance Sets
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays cross-country differences in (unfair) inequality in 2010 according to alternative specifications of
the circumstance set Ω. Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to the right of
the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed by
Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality
are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of total inequality
depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
Figure S.14 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
Accounting for Preferences
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays cross-country differences in (unfair) inequality in 2010 according to alternative treatments of
the correlation between the effort set Θ and the circumstance set Ω. Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European
country sample. Data points to the right of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions. (Unfair) inequality is calculated
based on the divergence measure proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total
inequality. Relative measures of unfair inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair
inequality in percent (in %) of total inequality depending on the alternative measurement specifications.
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Figure S.15 – Unfair Inequality across Countries, 2010
Alternative Minimum Thresholds
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Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This figure displays cross-country differences in (unfair) inequality in 2010 according to alternative specifications of
the poverty threshold ymin. Data points to the left of the vertical dashed line refer to the European country sample. Data points to the right
of the vertical dashed line refer to the US and its census regions. (Unfair) inequality is calculated based on the divergence measure proposed
by Magdalou and Nock (2011) with α = 0 (MN, α = 0) which corresponds to the MLD for total inequality. Relative measures of unfair
inequality are expressed in percent (in %) of total inequality. The gray area shows the range of unfair inequality in percent (in %) of total
inequality depending on the alternative measurement specifications. The construction of the alternative minimum thresholds is discussed in
Supplementary Material C.
Table S.6 – Rank Correlation across Countries, 2010
Magdalou and Nock Cowell Alm˚as et al.
α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2
Magdalou and Nock
α = 0 1.00 . . . . . .
α = 1 0.98 1.00 . . . . .
α = 2 0.95 0.99 1.00 . . . .
Cowell
α = 0 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 . . .
α = 1 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 . .
α = 2 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 .
Alm˚as et al.
0.95 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.00
Data: PSID and EU-SILC.
Note: Own calculations. This table displays rank correlations for unfair inequality across countries based on different divergence measures.
Unfair inequality is calculated based on the divergence measures proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011), Cowell (1985), and Alma˚s
et al. (2011).
41
References
Allen, R. C. 2017. “Absolute Poverty: When Necessity Displaces Desire”. American
Economic Review 107 (12): 3690–3721.
Alma˚s, I., A. W. Cappelen, J. T. Lind, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden. 2011.
“Measuring unfair (in)equality”. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7–8): 488–499.
Autor, D. H., and D. Dorn. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the
Polarization of the US Labor Market”. American Economic Review 103 (5): 1553–
1597.
Barry, B. 2005. Why Social Justice Matters. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cowell, F. A. 1985. “Measures of Distributional Change: An Axiomatic Approach”.
Review of Economic Studies 52 (1): 135–151.
EUROSTAT. 2013. European household income by groups of households. Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union.
Feenstra, R. C., R. Inklaar, and M. P. Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of the
Penn World Table”. American Economic Review 105 (10): 3150–3182.
Hu¨lle, S., S. Liebig, and M. J. May. 2018. “Measuring Attitudes Toward Distributive
Justice: The Basic Social Justice Orientations Scale”. Social Indicators Research 136
(2): 663–692.
Jolliffe, D., and E. B. Prydz. 2016. “Estimating international poverty lines from com-
parable national thresholds”. Journal of Economic Inequality 14 (2): 185–198.
Magdalou, B., and R. Nock. 2011. “Income distributions and decomposable divergence
measures”. Journal of Economic Theory 146 (6): 2440–2454.
Meyer, B. D., W. K. Mok, and J. X. Sullivan. 2015. “The Under-Reporting of Trans-
fers in Household Surveys: Its Nature and Consequences”. mimeo.
42
Shorrocks, A. F. 2012. “Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a unified
framework based on the Shapley value”. Journal of Economic Inequality 11 (1): 99–
126.
van den Boom, B., A. Halsema, and V. Molini. 2015. “Are We Confusing Poverty
with Preferences?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7247.
43
